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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Senator Russell Feingold squared off against
Representative Mark Neumann in a heated contest for a Wisconsin
Senate seat. During the campaign, Representative Neumann and
Senator Feingold voluntarily entered into a number of campaign
finance restrictions.' Representative Neumann, despite losing the race
to Senator Feingold, asserted that those restrictions "showed that
campaign finance reform didn't require changes in law and was best
handled on a voluntary basis. '2 In the 2000 New York Senate race,
Representative Rick Lazio echoed Representative Neumann's
sentiment and declared that it was he and "Mrs. Clinton's
opportunity, to make a statement about our commitment to campaign-
finance reform, to demonstrate that we don't need a law to do the right
thing."3 Soon thereafter, Representative Lazio and Mrs. Clinton
agreed to several voluntary campaign finance restrictions that, among
other things, banned soft money expenditures by political parties and
numerous interest groups. 4 Ironically, Senator Feingold, who is now
an avid supporter of increased government regulation of campaign
1. See Alan J. Borsuk & Richard P. Jones, Senate Rivals Offer Restraint in Campaign
Spending, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 1998, at 1. For examples, see infra Part IV.B.4.
2. Alan J. Borsuk, Feingold Asks Neumann for Campaign Reform Plan, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 1998, at 3.
3. Stephanie Saul & John Riley, A Divide on Soft-Money; Lazio, Clinton Camps Meet on
Ban, but Pact Is Doubted, NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 2000, at A06.
4. See infra Part IV.B.5.
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finance, originally proposed the voluntary restrictions, praised by
Representative Neumann and used effectively in the 2000 New York
Senate campaign.5
Historically, political scandal and public outcry have prompted
new regulations and restrictions on political expression and freedom of
speech. For instance, the Federal Elections and Campaign Act
("FECA") of 1971 was passed in response to allegedly large and
questionable contributions to President Nixon's successful presidential
campaign, and the subsequent regulations of 1974 sprung from the
Watergate crisis. 6 Unlike in the early 1970s, recent campaign finance
reform legislation has preceded public outcry and political scandal.7
For example, polls suggest that campaign finance reform has and
continues to trail significantly in importance to other issues such as
social security, combating terrorism, and education.8 Nonetheless, for
several years, Senators John McCain and Feingold have trumpeted
the corruptive influence of "soft money"9 in politics to generate support
for campaign finance reform. 10 On March 20, 2002, their tireless
5. Senator Feingold and Senator John McCain were coauthors and the primary supporters
of the most comprehensive campaign finance scheme since the Federal Elections and Campaign
Acts of 1971 and 1974. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001).
6. Kurt D. Dykstra, Comment, Sending the Parties "PAC-ing"? The Constitution,
Congressional Control, and Campaign Spending After Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Elections Commission, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (1998).
7. But see Dan Balz, In Long Battle, Small Victories Added Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2002, at A01 (suggesting that "final shove" for the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 was the Enron bankruptcy scandal).
8. In the summer of 1999, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll revealed that only 15% of eligible
voters felt campaign finance reform was an extremely important issue in determining their vote
in the 2000 elections, while 20% said the issue was not important at all. USA TODAY,
Polls/Surveys, USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll results, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
pol1024.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). A year later, a
Gallup poll revealed that campaign finance reform was not even in the top fifteen issues that
voters thought the next president should address upon taking office. Gallup News Service,
Education Reform: The Public's Opinion, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/release/prO10124b.asp
(last visited Oct. 24, 2001). In December 2000, only 1% of eligible voters thought campaign
finance reform should be the Bush Administration's top priority, compared with 13% for uniting
the county and 8% for education. Id. Another Gallup poll taken in January 2001 echoed the poll
taken in the summer of 1999, with only 16% of respondents indicating that campaign finance
reform was an extremely important issue. Gallup News Service, Public Dissatisfied with
Campaign Finance Laws, Support Limits on Contributions, at http://www.gallup.com
polllreleases/pr010803.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
9. Soft money is defined as "contributions made to the national parties for 'party-building'
activities that [are] exempt from the limits and restrictions of normal contributions." Larry
Makinson, The Old Soft Money Ain't What it Used to Be, CAP. EYE (Ctr. For Responsive Politics,
Washington, D.C.), Winter 2001, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/newsletter/ce74/
softmoney.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
10. See Russell D. Feingold, Representative Democracy Versus Corporate Democracy: How
Soft Money Erodes the Principle of "One Person, One Vote," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 383 (1998)
(articulating recent history of campaign finance reform efforts). The Senators' message has
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efforts prevailed as the Senate passed the most comprehensive
campaign finance legislation in nearly three decades-the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("the Act"). 1
Unlike other public policy issues, campaign finance reform is
unique because corrective legislation represents efforts by legislators
to regulate their own actions. While Senators McCain and Feingold
should be applauded for overcoming significant opposition and waning
public interest to pass campaign finance legislation, we should be
wary of the motives behind such legislation. For instance, legislators
are plausibly seen as largely motivated by self-interest. 12 In the name
of the public interest, they often advocate views and vote for
propositions that further their individual interests. 13 The behavior of
the legislature is no different regarding the issue of campaign finance
reform. For example, incumbents have an incentive to regulate
themselves to the disadvantage of would-be challengers. 14 In addition,
the legislators of the majority race and gender may appear to
implement regulations to assure they remain in the majority.15
Legislators are also driven by a desire for uniformity and control at
the expense of flexibility and freedom. The effectuation of these
perverse incentives is a prime example of how self-interested
legislators undermine the public purpose of legislation, thereby
creating inefficiencies and additional transaction costs within the
campaign finance system.16
This Note has three primary objectives. First, it will show that
public choice theory, particularly interest group competition, when
applied to campaign finance reform demonstrates the inherent and
unavoidable flaws of government-imposed campaign finance
apparently reached the voters because when addressed separately, campaign finance reform is
generally viewed favorably. For instance, a July 2001 Gallup poll suggested that when asked
directly, sixty-five percent of respondents favored Congress passing new campaign finance laws.
Gallup News Service, Gallup Poll Topics: Campaign Finance, at http://www.gallup.coml
polllindicators/indcamp-fin.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
In addition, an October 2000 poll indicated that seventy-two percent of respondents favored new
laws limiting the amount of soft money that an individual or group could contribute to a national
party. Id.
11. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. (2002).
12. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing out the Bathwater: Justice
Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 722 (1995) (describing how legislators
make regulatory decisions according to their own self-interest).
13. See id.
14. See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 168 (1997).
15. Cf. Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1473-74 (2001)
(describing the negative impacts of the current campaign finance system on people of color).
16. See John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes,
Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2053-54 (1995).
1246 [Vol. 55:1243
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regulation. Second, assuming campaign finance legislation is flawed,
this Note recommends that candidates supercede government
initiatives and regulate themselves based upon voter preferences by
entering into voluntary campaign finance agreements. Third, to
encourage the development of voluntary campaign finance
agreements, this Note draws upon social norms theory and discusses
ways in which voluntary agreements or the prohibition of soft money
could become a social norm. Part II summarizes the theoretical
concepts of public choice theory, free bargaining, and social norms
theory. Part III provides a brief history of campaign finance regulation
and jurisprudence, describes recent legislative efforts, and applies
interest group theory to the campaign finance debate of the summer of
2001 to illustrate why the public interest will not be served by
government-imposed campaign , finance reform. This Note
demonstrates that the Act will do little to curb campaign finance
abuses, and will likely create additional loopholes for interested
parties to exploit. Part IV addresses an alternative to government-
imposed campaign finance reform. This part proposes that candidates
for public office enter into voluntary campaign finance agreements
and allow the electorate to determine what level of "corruption" or the
"appearance thereof' they are willing to tolerate. 17 As a model, Part IV
describes several types of voluntary campaign finance agreements and
assesses their relative success or failure. Specifically, Part IV focuses
on the incentives that induced Representative Lazio and Mrs. Clinton
to enter into a historic, voluntary soft money ban in the 2000 New
York Senate race. This part also explains the creation of these
voluntary agreements and why they serve the public interest better
than government-imposed campaign finance reform. Lastly, in Part
IV, this Note draws upon social norms theory and suggests that
voluntary agreements could be an alternative to additional campaign
finance legislation through the creation and enforcement of social
campaign finance norms.
II. LEGAL THEORY BACKGROUND
A. Public Choice Theory and Interest Group Competition
In many ways, the theoretical underpinnings of public choice
theory can be traced to James Madison's distaste for factions.18 At the
17. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1976) (per curiam).
18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 280 (1988).
2002] 1247
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founding of the American republic, Madison perceived that self-
interested factions were inevitable and that the government should be
structured to minimize their influence. 19 He hoped that the
combination of the structural features of the legislature,
bicameralism, and the executive veto would protect representatives
from being captured by any single faction.20 This faith in the balance
between legitimate majoritarian government and rational public-
seeking government prevailed in political theory well into the
twentieth century. 21 As late as the 1950s, optimistic pluralists were
hopeful that interest groups would develop on all sides of an issue and
that the protective procedures of lawmaking would ensure rational
accommodation of interest groups' demands.2 2 Since that time,
political theory has come of age and the romantic notion of suppressed
interest group influence has been discarded by the wide acceptance of
public choice theory.23
Public choice theory first found its way into legal literature in
the early to mid-1980s. 24 Soon thereafter, Professor William Eskridge,
in a symposium on public choice, described the theory as having three
distinct arguments. 25 First, public choice theory demonstrates that
decisionmaking by majority rule yields arbitrary and discriminatory
results.26 This facet of public choice theory uses game theory27 to
examine legislation and voting to demonstrate that rational behavior
by the game players yields poor results for the entire group. 28 Second,
the theory depicts how interest groups skew public decisionmaking
toward private rent-seeking 29  and away from public interest
19. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961) ("It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society,
not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical
nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of
republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.").
20. Eskridge, supra note 18, at 280.
21. See id. at 281.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 283.
24. Maxwell L. Stearns, Restoring Positive Law and Economics: Introduction to Public
Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709, 711 (1998).
25. Eskridge, supra note 18, at 283.
26. Id.
27. See Martin Shubik, Just Winners and Losers: The Application of Game Theory to
Corporate Law and Practice: Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 285, 285 (1991) (describing game theory as "the study of the basic elements of many person
conscious conflict and cooperation," and as "deal[ing] at a high level of abstraction, with the
description and analysis of multiperson cross-purposes optimization").
28. Eskridge, supra note 18, at 283.
29. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM, L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986) ("Rent-seeking
[Vol. 55:12431248
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statutes.30 These theorists treat legislation as an economic transaction
and illustrate how the market for legislation is inefficient, producing
too few laws that provide "public goods" and too many laws that are
"rent-seeking. '31 Lastly, the theory shows Madison's "protections" do
little to safeguard the public from rent-seeking legislators. 32 For
example, public choice scholars, such as James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock, argue that the procedural protections designed in 1789 are
wholly inadequate today."a  They suggest that overlapping
constituencies in the House of Representatives and Senate dilute the
benefits of bicameralism and that the protections tend to discourage
legislatures from passing public goods legislation and do little to
prevent the approval of rent-seeking laws. 34
Public choice theory argues that legislative behavior is driven
by one primary goal-the representative's desire to be reelected. 35 At
the heart of this argument is the concept of interest group
competition. The origin of interest group theory can be traced to two
publications, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of
Consent, and George Stigler's The Theory of Economic Regulation.36
The theory suggests that government cannot be trusted to act in the
public interest because organized interest groups heavily influence
legislators and administrative agencies. 37 These groups compete for
"rent-seeking" legislation to benefit their own purpose at the expense
of another. 38 Statutes are viewed as commodities that are purchased 39
by competing interest groups, thereby undermining the public interest
that government is supposed to serve. 40 Therefore, interest group
refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for the use of an economic asset in
excess of the market price) through government intervention in the market."). An example of an
economic rent is the increased income enjoyed by a corporation that is awarded a monopoly
market position from the government. Id.
30. Id. at 224.
31. Eskridge, supra note 18, at 285.
32. Id. at 283.
33. See id. at 290-91.
34. Id. at 291 (citing JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
246-48, 286-91 (1962)).
35. Id. at 287.
36. Macey, supra note 29, at 224 n.6.
37. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 32 (1991). For a discussion of how groups act to articulate their policy
preferences and why they choose particular strategies for advocacy, see Marie Hojnacki, Interest
Groups'Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 61 (1997).
38. See Macey, supra note 29, at 224.
39. Id. at 227. The currency through which laws are bought and sold consists of political
support, promises of future favors, outright bribes, and campaign contributions. Id. at 228.
40. Id. at 224. This process is often described as legislators responding to market forces (i.e.,
strong incentives) by enacting laws that serve private rather than public interests. Id. This
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theory predicts that all the participants in the political process act to
further their own self-interest.41
As with Madison's fear of factions, interest group theory
"predicts that laws are likely to benefit the few at the expense of the
many, because no one has an incentive to enact" public interest
legislation.42 In other words, "all groups face a collective action
problem that may make [their] willingness to expend resources an
inaccurate proxy for the degree of group interest."43 Focused, special
interest groups, however, can overcome the "free rider" problem 44 and
lobby effectively for targeted wealth transfers.45 In addition, the costs
of procuring special interest legislation are relatively low. A majority
of the tangible expenses incurred in the process are borne by
taxpayers, and the legislators' only costs are loss of support from
adversely affected interest groups and the value of their time.46
Taxpayers are effectively shielded from the process because interest
groups and legislators filter the information the public receives about
special interest legislation.47
interaction can be diagrammed by a supply and demand curve, where interest groups make the
demands for favorable legislation and legislators supply the interest group legislation. See id. at
224 n.5. The amount of special interest legislation that is procured occurs at the equilibrium of
price and quantity between the two sets of preferences. See id.
41. Elhauge, supra note 37, at 35. But see generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (arguing that noneconomic
factors such as ideology and altruism play some role in political participation and
decisionmaking and that public interest preferences sometimes prevail over private interests).
42. Macey, supra note 29, at 231. Under the Wilson and Hayes Static Model, special
interest legislation has widely distributed costs and narrowly distributed benefits. Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 403 (1992).
The model predicts that special interest legislation will be oversupplied, while public interest
legislation (widely distributed costs and benefits) will be undersupplied. See id.
43. Elhauge, supra note 37, at 36.
44. For example, although every American presumably benefits from the National Parks
System, a single individual's action in support of the improvement of the national parks will
have a nominal effect. Therefore, someone acting rationally will "free-ride" on the efforts of
others, contributing nothing to the betterment of the National Parks System but benefiting from
the actions of others.
45. See Macey, supra note 29, at 231-32.
46. Id. at 232.
47. See id. at 230-31. For instance, in the debate over the Senate's Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 2001, supporters believed House Republicans would push for passage of
compromise legislation, the Ney bill, in order to force a House-Senate conference committee that
would reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills. Center for Responsive
Politics, Campaign Finance Reform-House, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
campaignfinance/house.debate.asp (last modified Feb. 6, 2002). Reformers believed, that once in
the conference committee and out of the public eye, the "powers that be" would kill the
legislation. See id. But see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 395 (1983) (arguing that increased dead weight costs of
regulation discourage interest groups' proponents while encouraging taxpayer opposition).
1250
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Despite the negative implications, interest group theory is
often credited with benefits such as providing a balancing test for
conflicting interests in the political process. 48 In addition, the political
process requires significant amounts of time and money to advocate a
position effectively. Therefore, an interest group's willingness to
expend resources is a proxy for the degree of that group's interest and,
consequently, their influence on the legislative process.49 If you also
assume that interest groups compete amongst themselves for those
limited resources, then a higher level of expenditure is a signal of the
most valued public or private interests. In addition, competition, as a
general rule, tends to breed more efficient outcomes. In the
marketplace of policy ideas, the more proposals put forward, arguably,
the better the legislative outcome.
As further discussed in Part III, the recent campaign finance
reform debate and the Act were heavily influenced by interest group
competition. Similar to proposals for tax reform or increased
environmental regulation, there were identifiable sets of interest
groups in support of, or in opposition to, comprehensive campaign
finance reform.50 As expected, these groups spent significant resources
to present their models for campaign finance legislation to members of
Congress and the American public.51 However, their lobbying was
somewhat complicated given the unique nature of campaign finance
reform. Unlike other legislative proposals, campaign finance
regulation has a direct impact upon the behavior of legislators and
their chances for reelection. Thus, the personal nature of the issue
increases the legislators' self-interest in the outcome of the legislation.
The combination of intense interest group pressure and increased
legislator self-awareness ensures that the public interest will be
sacrificed in the name of bipartisan campaign finance reform.
B. The Promise of Free Bargaining
Public choice theory suggests that regulations by self-interested
parties will yield inefficient results. As an alternative to legal
regulation, the freedom to contract offers a nonlegal alternative to
securing similar results. The freedom to contract is deeply embedded
in the American experience. The Framers of the Constitution included
the Contract Clause to prevent states from enacting any law
48. See Macey, supra note 29, at 231-32 (suggesting that only those special interest groups
that lobby the most effectively will obtain beneficial legislation).
49. See id. (suggesting that majoritarianism fails to account for intensity of preferences).
50. See infra Part III.C.1.
51. See infra Part III.C.1.
2002] 1251
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impairing the obligation of contracts. 52 Early interpretations of the
Clause include Chief Justice Marshall's only dissent on a
constitutional issue in which he suggested that the Contract Clause
generally secures to private parties the liberty to contract freely
without interference by the state.53 For these reasons, the Contract
Clause is often attributed as one of the Framers' principal vehicles to
promote personal freedom and autonomy as the best source of
economic prosperity and development. 54
Despite the historical belief in the freedom to contract, modern
scholarship has increasingly attacked free bargaining on several
fronts. First, some commentators suggest that free bargaining rests
exclusively on a laissez-faire ideology that is ill-suited for the
complexities of modern life.55 Second, free bargaining is questioned
because of the unavoidable obstacles of transaction costs and strategic
behavior problems involved in forming an agreement. 56 Third, due to
the increased effect of advertisements and external prejudices, free
bargaining is thought to be incapable of serving the consumer's best
interests. 57 Lastly, in the business context, neoinstitutional theorists
mock the validity of free bargaining when a deal goes bad and
informal agreements are relaxed or even ignored. 58 Echoing modern
Contract Clause jurisprudence, all of these attacks center around the
preservation of public contracts, however defined, rather than private
contracts. 59
Recently, the "modernist" critiques have been answered by
three groups of scholars who provide explanations for why contracts
should be binding, whether in morals or in law.60 Of particular
relevance to this Note, free bargaining is defended by law and
52. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
53. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 356-57 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the bankruptcy law in question, which operated prospectively, did not
violate the Constitution).
54. Bernard H. Siegan, One People as to Commercial Objects, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY & THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 101, 117 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard
Dickman eds., 1989).
55. F.H. BUCKLEY, THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1 (F.H. Buckley ed.,
1999).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (suggesting attacks influenced a generation of law students and lawyers into
looking for clever ways to avoid enforcement of private contracts); Michael W. McConnell,
Contract Rights and Property Rights, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY & THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 54, at 101, 159.
60. BUCKLEY, supra note 55, at 2.
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economics scholars from a consequentialist perspective. 61 That is, they
"test legal rules by reference to the social goals they serve" but with an
"understanding of the incentive effects of [those] legal rules."62
Specifically, law and economics scholars examine promissory
conventions on the basis of the consequences of nonperformance. 63 For
example, by entering into a private contract, the promisor is
undertaking a legal obligation to perform.64 The incentives for
entering the agreement could be to bind himself to perform on the
agreement or perhaps to invite stronger promisee reliance. 65 If the
promisor chooses to breach the contract, he places his assets as well as
his reputation on the line.66 This consequentialist account of free
bargaining suggests that inherent in every decision to contract is an
individual economic analysis of the costs and benefits of performance
or nonperformance. 67
In promoting free bargaining over legal rules, law and
economics scholars are mindful to point out its limitations. For
instance, "concerns about information costs, third-party effects, and
holdouts suggest the need for continued restrictions on bargaining
freedom."68 An important tool in "analyzing potentially inefficient
legal rules, especially those that thwart the ex ante expectations of
contracting parties," is best explained. by the Coase Theorem. 69
The Coase Theorem postulates that in situations where parties
have no significant impediments to reaching an agreement, they will
bargain for an efficient result.70 Specifically, the Coase Theorem
suggests that "in a world with zero transaction costs and perfect
information, resources will flow to their most highly valued uses
without regard to existing liability rules."71 Coase's insight was that
because transacting is costly, regulatory efforts succeed only to the
extent that rules are devised consistent with the ex ante expectations
61. Id. The other groups include the Neoformalists and the Kantians. Id. The Neoformalists
object to the politicization of private law and advocate "a return to the traditional ideal of the law
as an independent discipline." Id. Alternatively, the Kantians defend free bargaining by
suggesting "that private law institutions should respect abstract personal rights, including the
right to promise and the right to contract." Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Stearns, supra note 24, at 713.
70. See id.
71. Id.
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of the affected parties.7 2 When inefficient rules are crafted, regulators
increase the odds of inefficient outcomes that parties might be unable
to avoid through contracting. 73 Therefore, a primary benefit of private
contracting is that it allows the bargaining parties to exploit
government inefficiencies and to create a more beneficial outcome for
themselves. 74
Law and economics scholars have argued for the extension of
free bargaining principles to areas such as tort law, real estate zoning,
family law, corporate reorganization law, and conflicts of law. 75 For
instance, in the area of domestic bankruptcy reorganization, Professor
Robert Rasmussen argues that free bargaining could create efficiency
gains over government regulation in the areas of domestic and
transnational bankruptcy reorganization. 76 He proposes a "menu"
approach for domestic reorganizations in which parties would choose
from a list of possible options in the reorganization law that best fits
their financial situation.77 The menu might include present Chapter
11 provisions or perhaps more restrictive reorganization structures,
such as private receivership. 78  For multinational corporations,
Professor Rasmussen suggests, similar to contracting for choice of law
provisions, allowing firms to select the forum to adjudicate their
bankruptcy. 79 Ultimately, Professor Rasmussen concludes that firms,
prior to reaching a state of financial distress, are better able to select
the appropriate bankruptcy procedure than a mandatory rule that
allows managers a restricted choice between reorganization and
liquidation.8 0
In Part IV, this Note posits that the principles of free
bargaining could also be extended to the rules governing campaign
finance. Under current law, when a candidate wishes to raise funds in
an election for federal office, he agrees to a host of federal campaign
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 714-15.
75. See generally BUCKLEY, supra note 55, pts. II-VI.
76. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 311-24 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter
Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy]; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A
Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53 (1992) (rejecting the idea "that
bankruptcy law is a mandatory rule.., by the government that cannot be altered by those whom
it affects").
77. See Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy, supra note 76, at 312-19.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 321-22.
80. Id. at 318-19.
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finance regulations.8' A candidate has neither a choice in the type of
restrictions that govern his actions nor an opportunity to discuss those
conditions with his opponent. Essentially, a candidate enters some
form of "social contract" that is consistently breached by exploiting
inefficiencies in the campaign finance system. Recently, several sets of
candidates have sought to cure these inefficiencies by entering
mutually beneficial, voluntary campaign finance agreements to govern
their behavior. 82 Drawing on Professor Rasmussen's argument for
contract-driven bankruptcy regimes, this Note suggests that voluntary
campaign finance agreements would. not only allow candidates to
bargain for rules better suited for their individual needs but also to
produce campaigns more in line with public expectations. One central
difference between the approaches is that Professor Rasmussen's
"freedom" involves the choice of regulatory regimes, while this Note
argues that the "freedom" of voluntary campaign finance agreements
involves the absence of a regulatory regime. Nonetheless, both types of
"freedom" are supported by the principles of private bargaining.
C. Production of Social Norms
The promise of voluntary agreements is plagued by a general
lack of cooperation between candidates. In order for candidates and
society to benefit from the gains of voluntary agreements, there must
be some enforcement mechanism to encourage cooperation.8 3 The
Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates the difficulty with voluntary
cooperation.8 4 The following table provides the payoffs of the dilemma
faced by Candidate A and Candidate B, each of whom can choose to
refrain or spend soft money.8
81. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000).
82. See infra Part V.B.
83. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 13 (2000). Posner argues that
institutional enforcement mechanisms can be divided into legal and nonlegal mechanisms. Id. at
14-15.
84. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a tool for analyzing situations in which mutual cooperation
can benefit both parties; however, each party has a dominant incentive to maximize its own
gains by refusing to cooperate as long as the other party continues to cooperate. Linda Cohen &
Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477, 498-500 (1992) (applying the Prisoner's
Dilemma to the political environment). See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 16-
35 (1982) (discussing the logic of collective action, game theory, and the Prisoner's Dilemma). For
a discussion of the same type of "group action problem" in the context of the selection process for
judicial clerks, see Jonathan Groner, Disarming the Clerks Race: Judge Offers Proposal to Slow
Recruitment Process, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 1, WESTLAW, Legal Times.
85. While this model depicts a two-party interaction, the same analysis would apply to
interactions among multiple parties.
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Candidate B
Refrain Spend
Candidate A Refrain 2,2 0,3
Spend 3,0 1,1
Generally, each candidate reasons that no matter how the
other candidate chooses to proceed, his best option is to spend soft
money.8 6 That is because a defining feature of the Prisoner's Dilemma
is that defection is a player's dominant strategy regardless of what the
other party chooses to do.8 7 Therefore, both candidates spend and the
lowest payoff is achieved (1,1). The optimal outcome for the candidates
and society is achieved if both candidates choose to refrain (2,2);
however, individual incentives routinely override the collective
benefit, and society suffers.88
Assuming additional campaign finance legislation does not
serve the public interest, what forms of nonlegal cooperation are
available to encourage candidates to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma
and consent to voluntary agreements? The most common approach to
solving the dilemma is to repeat the game.8 9 However, in the electoral
context, the likelihood of the same candidates facing one another
again is relatively small.90 Another approach to induce cooperation
could be to change the candidates' payoffs through the informal
enforcement of social norms by voters, other politicians, and the
media.91 These unofficial enforcers could use punishments, such as
vote switching, negative gossip, and poor media coverage, to discipline
malefactors and use rewards, such as esteem and enhanced political
opportunities, to applaud those who cooperate. 92 These informal
systems of external control are often more influential than the law in
many contexts, especially where the interacting parties have a
continuing relationship and nontangible assets are at stake.93
86. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 84, at 497-98.
87. Id. at 498-500.
88. For example, both candidates are faced with need to raise money to win the election,
and why should they refrain from raising money when the other candidate is still raising money.
89. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 84, at 498-500.
90. It is possible, however, to suppose that Senator Clinton and Lazio, for example, will
interact on other fronts, and this may be enough for cooperation to be rational.
91. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 84, at 502-03 (suggesting legislative self-enforcement as a
mechanism to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma).
92. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537, 540 (1998) (discussing the way in which "acquaintances, bystanders, [and] trading partners"
are able to enforce social mores by informal methods).
93. Id. Using Coase's example of cattle trespass between a farmer and a rancher on
adjoining lands, Ellickson challenges Coase's conclusion and suggests that because of the
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Sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists have long
studied the creation and enforcement of norms as well as the pairing
of norms with social roles. 94 Only recently have law professors and
political scientists begun to stress the role of informal social controls
and their relation to "the public institutions that promulgate and
enforce legal rules."95 Their work has developed into a legal theory
referred to as "social norms theory," which examines how informal
social controls and behavioral regularities can fundamentally alter the
analysis of a social problem.96 For instance, a pattern of behavior may
develop in a community even though a rule is never explicitly
formulated, or, on the other hand, a pattern of behavior may not
evolve in a community despite the existence of a rule. 97 Therefore, the
existence of a norm, or rationally governed behavior, can be logically
separate from an articulated rule. 98
Of particular relevance to the production of social norms are
the concepts of reputation, signaling, and the existence of norm
entrepreneurs. 99 One way to enhance agreement is to replace the
conditions of the Prisoner's Dilemma with an environment that
promotes cooperation, especially circumstances that facilitate the
development of reputation. 100 In this model, reputation can facilitate
cooperation through a repeated game,1' or reputation can alter a
candidate's payoff based upon negative or positive reaction from the
public. Another important aspect of the creation of social norms is that
patterns of behavior emerge from "signaling."'' 0 2 Signaling facilitates
continuing relationship between neighbors, the farmer and rancher would apply social norms to
govern their behavior rather than turning to the legal system. Id. While this might make it seem
that Coase promotes formal resolution of such situations, Coase's point is, rather, that the law
establishes the legal entitlements that then serve as the starting point for bargaining. See Robert
C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 67, 81-83 (1987) (criticizing the "legal centralism" of modern law and economics scholars).
94. Ellickson, supra note 92, at 542.
95. Id. at 543. For instance, "in the mid-1990s norms became one of the hottest topics in the
legal academy," with several major symposia devoted to the subject. Id.
96. See id.; see also POSNER, supra note 83, at 34 (describing social norms as the "behavioral
regularities that occur in equilibrium when people use signals to show that they belong to the
'good' type").
97. Steven Hetcher, Spies in the House of Online Privacy 6 (Aug. 28, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
98. Id. at 7.
99. See POSNER, supra note 83.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. (explaining that "people are more likely to cooperate when they expect to have
repeated dealings with each other than when they expect never to see each other again").
102. Id. at 18. Assume that there are two types of individuals: "cooperative" types and
"opportunistic" types. Id. "Holding everything else equal, a good type is more likely to cooperate"
in the Prisoner's Dilemma because they care "more about the future payoffs that are lost if
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social norms in" two ways. First, people engage in costly actions, such
as gift-giving or shunning a particular form of behavior, to signal that
they value future payoffs and wish to cooperate. 10 3 Second, when
people engage in cheap, noncooperative actions, like waiting patiently
in line, their deviation from the norm will be punished by others who
will signal their desire to cooperate by shunning the unaccepted
pattern of behavior.104 Therefore, social norms become the patterns of
behavior reflecting the individual signaling behaviors of the actors
seeking to indicate their desire to cooperate. 10 5 Lastly, the individuals
who promote the change of social norms are referred to as norm
entrepreneurs.1 06 These entrepreneurs, or change agents, stimulate
demand and supply new norms by promoting a type of behavior that
takes on a symbolic value.1 07
Law and economics scholars have used social norms theory to
understand and criticize a variety of laws, 08 while others have used
the theory to examine self-regulatory efforts. 10 9 For instance, as
Internet use has exploded, the concern for personal privacy has
become an important public policy issue."0 In an effort to subvert
regulatory efforts, several website operators have responded to
demands for greater online privacy with a set of industry norms
cooperation fails." Id. Cooperative types prefer interacting with each other and avoiding the
opportunistic types. Id. at 19. In order to distinguish themselves from the opportunistic types,
cooperative types engage in actions that are called signals. Id. Because a cooperative type "is a
person who values future returns" more than an opportunistic type, his signal is likely to involve
'large, observable costs prior to entering a relationship." Id. In equilibrium, the cooperative types
"send the signal and match up with each other," and the opportunistic types "do not send a signal
and either match up with each other or not at all." Id. The equilibrium results in a "separating
equilibrium." Id.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 25-26.
105. Hetcher, supra note 97, at 60-61.
106. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996).
107. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10-12
(2001).
108. See generally POSNER, supra note 83 (applying social norms theory to family law,
criminal law, racial discrimination, and contract law).
109. See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 97, 116 (2000) (modeling the relationships in the online privacy debate as
iterated collective action problems).
110. See Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal
Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457,
1479 (2001) (citing a 1997 survey indicating that a "majority of consumers engaging in online
activities are worried about the confidentiality and security of the Internet"); Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to
Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 552 (1999) (citing concerns by privacy advocates that
processor identification systems threaten personal privacy on the Internet).
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regarding the collection and use of consumer data.111 These norms
include extensive "privacy policies with varying elements of choice,
notice, access and security" and the creation of "Chief Privacy Officers"
within the organizations. 1 2 The "cooperative" websites are those
"willing to forgo the short-term benefit of not respecting user privacy
in order to promote the long-term benefits" of "cooperative
relationships with more trusting users.""113 While some privacy
advocates have called self-regulation an "abject failure,""14 the
development of online privacy norms is an example of overcoming the
Prisoner's Dilemma through cooperation and signaling.
In Part IV, this Note applies the concepts of reputation,
signaling, and norm entrepreneurs to the cooperation problems of
voluntary campaign finance agreements. Similar to online privacy
concerns, legislators are anxious to cure perceived corruptive
influences with new campaign finance restrictions. Political
innovators, however, have superceded legislative efforts with self-
regulatory schemes designed to accommodate the public's expectations
of reasonable campaign finance limitations. 1 5 Despite the innovator's
relative success, the question remains whether isolated voluntary
agreements could develop into a national standard to replace
additional campaign finance reform. This Note concludes that the
development and enforcement of social campaign finance norms is
possible and would be more efficient than additional government
regulation.
III. PUBLIC CHOICE APPLICATION TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
A. History of Campaign Finance Regulation
Before applying public choice theory and interest group
competition to the campaign finance debate of the summer of 2001, it
is important to understand the regulatory and judicial context from
which the current system has developed." 6 Of particular importance
are the initial regulatory efforts contained in the FECA of 1971 and
1974 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of that law in the
111. Hetcher, supra note 97, at 2.
112. Id. at 61.
113. Id.
114. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1287
(2000) (citing studies that show self-regulation "works far better at enhancing commerce in
personal data that it does in protecting personal data privacy").
115. See infra Part IV.B.
116. This part is written under the assumption that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 will not take effect until November of 2002, and only if it survives a challenge in the courts.
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seminal campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo. 117 While these events
took place nearly three decades ago, their importance is still felt today
as legislators attempt to deal with their resulting uncertainties and
ambiguities. In addition, this section attempts to shed some light on a
particular form of campaign finance-soft money, which in recent
years has become the primary target for campaign finance reformers.
1. The FECA of 1971 and 1974
Congress first attempted to regulate the campaign finance
industry in response to allegations that large campaign contributions
by a wealthy individual led to President Nixon's successful
presidential campaign. 118 The FECA of 1971 included several major
regulations, 119 but it also contained various deficiencies that rendered
it ineffective. 120 The Watergate scandal three years later led Congress
to pass the most comprehensive campaign finance reform to date, the
FECA of 1974, substantially amending the FECA of 1971.121 The
FECA of 1974 contained four basic reforms: (1) disclosure
requirements; 122 (2) limits on campaign contributions to candidates,
political action committees ("PACs"), and political parties; 123 (3)
partial public funding of presidential elections;' 24 and (4) limits on
campaign expenditures by candidates and political parties.1 25 Most
importantly, the FECA of 1974 created the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") to administer and enforce the new regulations. 126
Consequently, the statute transformed "running for federal office into
a regulated industry."127
117. 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam).
118. See Dykstra, supra note 6, at 1211.
119. The Act had five major components: (1) it repealed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925; (2) it required the disclosure of contributions exceeding $1,000 by political committees; (3)
it required the disclosure of contributions by individuals in excess of $100; (4) it limited
expenditures for use in the media; and (5) it limited contributions and expenditures from a
candidate's personal funds. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3, 15-20 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000)).
120. Similar to previous attempts to reform the campaign finance system, the FECA of 1971
failed to establish an administrative body to implement and enforce the law, and the expenditure
limits only applied to the media. See id.
121. The Federal Election and Campaign Finance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88
Stat. 1263-68 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000)).
122. 2 U.S.C § 434 (2000).
123. Id. § 441a(a).
124. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003-04 (1994).
125. § 441a(b), (d).
126. Id. § 437(c).
127. Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 4.
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The regulatory scheme created by the FECA limits and
monitors the amount of "hard money" 128 used to finance elections for
federal office. 129 Different limits apply depending on whether the
money is characterized as a "contribution" or an "expenditure."130 For
example, money given directly to a candidate by an individual or a
political party is considered a contribution, while money spent by an
individual or party to support the candidate represents an
expenditure on the candidate's behalf.1 31 In addition, the regulations
differentiate between the types of entities that contribute or spend
campaign resources. For instance, the FECA limits the amount of
"hard money" that political parties can receive, contribute to, and
spend on behalf of candidates in a federal election.13 2 In addition, the
FECA limits an individual's contribution to a political committee that
is established and maintained by a national political party to $20,000
per year.13 3 The FECA also limits the expenditure levels of national
and state party committees that are made in coordination with
candidates for federal office. 134
While relatively effective in controlling the flow of "hard
money" in elections for federal office, the FECA's regulatory scheme,
until recently, did not treat "soft money" with the same degree of
scrutiny.1 35 Soft money is generally described as the "unlimited funds
raised by party committees that can be used for a wide array of
activities that can indirectly benefit federal candidates."136 Prior to the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, FECA's lack of attention to
128. Hard money generally refers to the money raised and spent in accordance with federal
law that may be used in connection with election for federal office. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG.
RESEARCH Serv., Soft and Hard Money in Contemporary Elections: What Federal Law Does and
Does Not Regulate (Jan. 10, 1997) [hereinafter CANTOR], available at http://www.opensecrets.
org/parties/s97-91.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (2000) (defining contributions); id. § 431(9)(A) (defining
expenditures).
132. Id. § 441a(a) (limiting contributions from political parties); id. § 441a(d) (limiting
expenditures by political parties).
133. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(B).
134. Charles Lane, High Court to Review FEC Limits; Case Challenges Parties' Spending on
House, Senate Candidates, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2000, at A08 ("For the 2000 race, the [hard
money] limits [were] $13.7 million for the presidential nominees, about $67,000 for House races
and between $135,000 and $3.3 million for Senate races, depending on state population.").
135. See CANOTR, supra note 128.
136. Farrah Nawaz, Campaign Finance Reform "Dollar for Votes"-The American
Democracy, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 155, 162 n.44 (1999) (quoting Investigation of
Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection With the 1996 Federal Election Campaign-Part
VIII: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 105th Cong. 128 (1997)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Anthony Corrado, Professor of Government, Colby College)).
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soft money contributions was evident in three primary areas: (1)
unregulated contributions to state and local political parties; (2)
unlimited transfers between federal, state, and local political party
committees; and (3) the lack of a discernible definition of "federal
election activity. '' 137 These gaps in the FECA aided the proliferation of
soft money and constituted the "loopholes" that Senators McCain and
Feingold sought to plug.138
2. Buckley v. Valeo
In the seminal campaign finance case, Buckley v. Valeo, the
petitioners challenged the regulations of the FECA of 1974 as a
violation of the First Amendment. 139 In its first interpretation of the
FECA, the Supreme Court declared, that both the contribution and
expenditure regulations limited First Amendment rights. 40 For
example, the Court believed that placing limits upon a political party
in a campaign ran facially afoul of the First Amendment.141
Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that contribution limits could be
justified by a governmental interest in protecting the electoral system
from real or apparent corruption arising from donations to or activity
coordinated with candidates. 42 Therefore, the Court struck down
certain limits on expenditures, including those by a candidate from
personal funds, a campaign committee, and an independent group
appealing directly to voters, but it left intact the FECA's contribution
regulations for money involved in federal elections. 143
137. See Senator Russell D. Feingold, Special Interests and Soft Money, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 59, 59 (1998).
138. For a discussion of the development of the "soft money" loophole, see ANTHONY J.
CORRADO, INTRODUCTION TO PARTY SOFT MONEY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A
SOURCEBOOK 167-73 (Anthony J. Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
139. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 603 (Alaska 1999) (stating that the
wellspring of modern campaign finance jurisprudence is Buckley v. Valeo).
140. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam) (indicating that contributing to
or expending money on behalf of a candidate is equivalent to political speech).
141. Id. at 29, 58-59 (reasoning that only contributions can be limited).
142. Id. at 25-29 (stating purpose of the Act is to prevent corruption).
143. See id. at 39-58. The Court's decision left intact only voluntary spending limits, such as
in the presidential public funding system. See id. Following the Court's decision, Congress
amended the FECA to comply with Buckley's holding that the Act's expenditure limits were
unconstitutional. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90
Stat. 475 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000)). In 1980, the Act was amended yet again
(Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000))) in response to a Harvard commission's determination
that the FECA weakened political parties and unduly burdened campaigns for federal office.
INST. OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIV., 96TH CONG., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT 1972-78, at vii (Comm. Print 1979). Since that time, Congress has
refrained from instituting any major changes to the structure of the federal campaign finance
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In Buckley, several federal officeholders and supporting
political organizations sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief from the FECA of 1974, alleging violations of the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 144 The lower courts
sustained the FECA; the court of appeals commented favorably that
the legislation was "by far the most comprehensive reform legislation
[ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of President, Vice-
President, and members of Congress. 145  The Supreme Court,
however, applied a different interpretation of the First Amendment
and affirmed in part and reversed in part.1 46 Relying largely on a First
Amendment distinction between political' expression and political
association, the Court created a dichotomy1 47 that set into motion the
modern campaign finance system.1 48
system. But see Full and Fair Political Activity Disclosure Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-230, 114 Stat.
477 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 527, 6012, 6033, 6104, 6652) (mandating full disclosure of
contributions to organizations claiming tax-exempt status under § 527 of the tax code ("the 527
law")). The 527 law, the first major campaign finance reform to pass Congress in twenty years,
was designed to force into view undisclosed, election-related contributions and spending to and
from both hard and soft money accounts. Press Release, Office of Senator John McCain, 527
Reformers Clarify Intentions, Send Letters to IRS, Treasury (July 26, 2000), at
http://www.senate.gov/-mccain/527irs.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 8-11. Specifically, the petitioners argued that the court of appeals
failed to give the FECA the critical scrutiny demanded under the First Amendment and equal
protection guarantees. Id. at 11. In their view, limiting the use of money for political purposes
constituted a restriction on communication in violation of the First Amendment, since virtually
all meaningful political communications involve the expenditure of money. Id.
145. Id. at 7 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The court of
appeals found a "clear and compelling interest" in preserving the integrity of the electoral
process. Id. at 10 (quoting Buckley, 519 F.2d at 841). On that basis, the court upheld, with one
exception, the substantive provisions of the FECA, including the constitutionality of the newly
established FEC. Id. at 10.
146. Id. at 143-44. Commentators at the time suggested that the Supreme Court's conclusion
on the First Amendment issues differed so much from that of the court of appeals that one might
have thought their perceptions of the underlying facts or law were entirely different. Polsby,
supra note 127, at 17.
147. For instance, the Court declared that contributor speech, whether made by an
individual or a political party, was simply an expression of support for the candidate made with
the first dollar contributed. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (adding that quantity of communication does
not increase with the size of the donor's contribution, since the expression rests solely on the act
of contributing). Therefore, "a limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a
candidate ... involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the
symbolic expression of support ... but does not ... infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss
candidates and issues." Id. In contrast, the Court held expenditure limits on nonparty entities
unconstitutional because they "substantially" restrained political expression and were not
supported by compelling state interests. Id. at 19, 55-58.
148. See id. at 17-18. By refusing to separate "campaign speech" and "spending money," the
Court struck down all expenditure limitations, including limitations on a candidate's use of his
own private fortune and expenditures by persons unconnected with a campaign organization,
each of which have helped fuel the escalation in the cost of running for elective office. See id. at
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3. The Emergence of Soft Money
The arrival of soft money as an important campaign financing
tool further complicated the campaign finance system developed under
the FECA and modified by Buckley. In 1978, the FEC issued an
advisory opinion 149 that allowed political parties to pay for party
building activities 150 with money raised pursuant to federal rules (i.e.,
hard money) and money raised outside the federal rules (i.e., soft
money). 151 The advisory opinion was later codified in the 1979 FECA
amendments.1 52  The purpose behind this modification was to
encourage the involvement of state and local political parties in
federal and nonfederal elections. 15 3 This new rule gave rise to the
concept of "mixed activities,"'154 which allows state and local parties to
use soft money to promote an entire slate of candidates, while limiting
what hard money could be spent to directly benefit an individual
candidate for federal office.1 55 The difficulty in distinguishing the
benefit of "mixed activities" to federal candidates or state and local
149. See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10, available at http://herdon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao780010.html
(on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
150. This ruling further increased the role of state and local parties by also exempting
certain grassroots, registration, and voter drive activities. CANTOR, supra note 128.
151. See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (1978), supra note 149 (discussing exceptions for party-
building activities); Feingold, supra note 10, at 380 (describing the soft money loophole).
152. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B) (2000) ('The term 'contribution' does not include... (v) the
payment by a State or local committee of a political party of the costs of preparation, display, or
mailing.., with respect to a printed slate card or sample ballot... ; (x) the payment by a State
or local committee of a political party of the costs of campaign materials ... provided that-(3)
such payments are not made from contributions designated to be spent on behalf of a particular
candidate... ; (xii) the payment by a State or local committee of a political party of the costs of
voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities .... "); see also id. § 431(9)(B) ("The term
'expenditure' does not include ... (ii) nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals to
vote or to register to vote ... ; (iv) the payment by a State or local party of ... the costs of... a
printed slate card or sample ballot ... ; (viii) the payment by a State or local party of the costs of
campaign materials ... used by such committee in connection with volunteer activities on behalf
of nominees of such party ... ; (ix) the payment by a State or local committee of a party of the
costs of voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities conducted by such committee on behalf
of nominees of such party for President and Vice President.").
153. This action has been called "a conscious effort by Congress to empower state and local
party committees in federal campaigns." HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY,
ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 67 (4th ed. 1992). Interestingly, labor unions actually
developed the concept of soft money after a 1943 ban on union money in federal elections.
CANTOR, supra note 128. In addition to creating PACs composed of union members to donate
directly to candidates, unions also found ways to influence public policy through state and local
candidate donations and "nonpartisan" education, voter, and registration drives. Id.
154. The term refers to contributions that are spent on activities that benefit both federal
and state or local candidates.
155. See CANOTR, supra note 128.
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candidates reflects the FEC's and Congress's general reluctance to
formally define and separate the activities. 156 Critics argue that these
gaps in federal campaign finance law allow individuals, corporations,
and labor unions to circumvent federal contribution limits by using
political parties as a conduit for large contributions of soft money
intended to benefit a particular candidate. 157
The last three presidential election cycles have seen an
explosion in campaign spending, resulting in nearly $3 billion in total
expenditures during the 2000 campaign season. 158 Soft money is at the
core of this explosive growth, as demonstrated by the Democratic and
Republican national party committees record $463 million in soft
money collections from January 1, 1999 through January 12, 2001.159
This amount represented a 100 percent increase over the same period
in 1996 and an astonishing 459 percent increase over the 1992
election. 160 More notably, in 1992, soft money accounted for only
eighteen percent of the parties' overall fundraising, whereas it
represented thirty-five percent of total Republican contributions and
forty-seven percent of money raised by the Democratic Party in
156. Clarisa Long, Note, Shouting Down the Voice of the People: Political Parties, Powerful
PACs, and Concerns About Corruption, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1190 (1994). However, in 1991,
the FEC implemented regulations that now require political committees that have federal and
nonfederal accounts and engage in mixed activities to allocate their expenditures according to
specified formulae. CANTOR, supra note 128. The FEC has never formally elaborated on these
guidelines. Id. In addition, to monitor the amount of soft money being raised, the regulations
require the disclosure of (1) all national party activity; and (2) state and local party nonfederal
account spending on mixed activities. Id. (referring to 11 C.F.R. §§ 102, 104, 106 (1994)). But see
also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. § 101 (2002) (defining
federal election activity and prohibiting soft money in federal elections).
157. See Feingold, supra note 10, at 379-83 (describing the soft money channel as "deeper
than a well and far wider than a church door," and claiming that parties pay for much of their
television advertising supporting candidates with soft money); see also Hearings, supra note 136,
at 128 (testimony of Prof. Anthony Corrado) (underscoring gently the general presumption that
soft money is the greatest corruptive influence in the modern campaign finance system.).
158. See Nawaz, supra note 136, at 165 (citing studies that estimated total campaign
spending to be $1.6 billion in 1992 and $2.2 billion in 1996). This estimate represents all funds
spent on the presidential and congressional races, including the money spent by outside groups
to influence the elections primarily through issue ads. Holly Bailey, The Final Day: A Look at
What Made Campaign 2000 the Most Expensive Ever, at http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v5/
alertv5_63.asp (Nov. 6, 2000).
159. Common Cause, National Parties Raise Record $463 Million in Soft Money During
1999-2000 Election Cycle, at http://commoncause.org/publications/febO1/020701st.htm (Feb. 7,
2001).
160. Total soft money collected in 1995-96 was $236 million, while the parties raised only
$84 million in 1991-92. Id. These increases are even more dramatic when compared to the $9
million raised for the 1980 presidential election, $12 million in 1984, and $45 million in 1988.
Nawaz, supra note 136, at 165.
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2000.161 The large soft money transfers from national to state and
local political parties are of particular concern to soft money
opponents. 162 In 1999-2000, the national parties sent $289 million, or
sixty-two percent of their total soft money contributions, to state or
local political parties. 163 Not surprisingly, eighty-three percent of the
soft money transfers were concentrated in the top twenty battleground
states. 64 These figures illustrate that soft money has evolved from an
obscure feature of an underutilized FEC ruling into one of the most
effective, and therefore, viciously contested campaign financing tools.
B. Latest Attempt at Reform: The Bipartisan Campaign Finance
Reform Act of 2002
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, federal lawmakers largely
ignored the issue of campaign finance reform. 65 Legislators often
campaigned for the need to "clean up" the campaign finance system,
but comprehensive reform was not galvanized until the mid-1990s. 166
In 1996, Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold began work on a
bipartisan, comprehensive campaign finance reform effort. 167 Driven
by the belief that large contributions elevated candidates' allegiance to
their chief donors above their ideologies and responsibilities to
161. Center for Responsive Politics, Total Raised: Democratic and Republican Parties, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/total.asp? (last visited May 14, 2002) (providing figures on
fundraising for both Democratic and Republican parties).
162. Generally, supporters contribute to political parties at the national level, and that
money is then transferred to state or local parties for use in party-building activities. Nawaz,
supra note 136, at 163. For example, suppose Bonnie Benevolent, a known supporter of Senate
candidate C from state Z, donates the maximum amount of hard money allowed under federal
law to candidate C and political party P. Benevolent also contributes $500,000 to a campaign
committee of political party P, which then transfers the money to the Ps state political party in
state Z. The contribution is then spent on an advertising campaign addressing federal issues
crucial to candidate Cs campaign. State political party P describes the advertisement as legal
party-building activities, while critics contend the contribution and expenditure subvert federal
campaign finance law.
163. Center for Responsive Politics, Election Overview, 2000 Cycle, Soft Money Transfers to
States, at http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/party2state.asp (last visited May 14, 2002)
(basing results on data released by the FEC on November 1, 2001). While an inordinate amount
of money, these figures illustrate that twenty-two years later, soft money is being used as the
original FEC Advisory Opinion intended. See supra text accompanying notes 149-67.
164. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 163. The top twenty jurisdictions to receive
soft money transfers were (in descending order): Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Missouri,
California, Washington, Ohio, New York, Illinois, Virginia, Oregon, North Carolina, Wisconsin,
Kentucky, Texas, District of Columbia, Iowa, Minnesota, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Id.
165. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
166. The battle for reform began in the mid-1980s, suffered a 1992 veto by then-President
Bush, and repeated parliamentary roadblocks by opponents in the Senate. Balz, supra note 7.
167. See Feingold, supra note 10, at 383 (describing the history of campaign finance reform
proposals in the Senate).
1266
2002] CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1267
national concerns, the Senators fought tirelessly against the perceived
evils of soft money and negative issue advertisements. 168 Specifically,
they claimed that soft money did little to encourage political
participation, and instead, increased the public's political indifference
and cynicism by underwriting much of the negative advertising that
was intended to decrease voter turnout. 169 Despite the Senators'
passionate arguments for reform, the McCain-Feingold bill, as their
legislative effort became known, never made it off the Senate floor.170
In the 2000 race for the Republican Party's presidential
nomination, Senator McCain took his campaign finance reform
message to the voters. 171 While ultimately unsuccessful in the
presidential race, his anthem propelled his popularity and power
within the Senate, and in March 2001, Senator McCain and his
supporters negotiated a deal with Senate Republican leaders to debate
the McCain-Feingold-Cochran bill' 72 on the Senate floor.173 Following
two weeks of intense debate, 174 on April 2, 2001, the reformers
prevailed, and the Senate voted 59-41 in favor of the Bipartisan
168. Senator John McCain, Editorial, Ban the Soft Money, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2000, at
B07.
169. Id. But see Ray LaRaja, A Ban on Soft Money Could Backfire, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11, 2001,
at A35 (stating that in 1998, almost eighty-five percent of soft money spent by state parties was
not related to issue ads, and in presidential years, where the portion of soft money spent on
media tends to be higher, sixty-five percent of the soft money went to things other than ads).
170. Center for Responsive Politics, Campaign Finance Reform-Senate, at http://www.open
secrets.org/news/campaignfinance/senate.debate.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
171. G. Robert Hillman, McCain Seeks to Cancel Bush Meeting, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 28, 2000, at 9A (indicating that campaign finance reform was a "keystone of his maverick
campaign that appealed to many independent voters").
172. Historically referred to as the McCain-Feingold bill, the bill's name was changed when
Senator Thad Cochran agreed to support the bill. This version of the McCain-Feingold bill was
introduced in the Senate on January 22, 2001. See Press Release, Office of Senator John McCain,
McCain, Feingold, Cochran Introduce Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 (Jan. 22, 2001),
at http://www.senate.gov/-mccain/cfrOlcoch.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
173. Center for Responsive Politics, Campaign Finance Reform, at http://www.opensecrets.
org/news/campaign.finance.asp(last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
174. Conservative Republicans, led by Senator Mitch McConnell, opposed the bill, and
continue to believe that virtually any limitation on campaign fundraising or spending is a
violation of free speech protected by the First Amendment. Center for Responsive Politics, supra
note 173. President Bush, seeking the middle ground on an issue largely ignored in his
campaign, proposed his own set of reforms just days before the Senate debate. Id. Specifically,
President Bush suggested a ban on soft money contributions from corporations and labor unions
(but not from individuals) and a requirement that those groups obtain permission before using
shareholder or member funds for political activities. Id. In addition to rejecting this alternative,
the bill also survived three "poison pill" amendments that could have doomed the legislation.
First, Senator Hagel introduced an amendment that would have capped soft money contributions
to national party committees at $60,000 per year. Id. Also, Senator Hatch proposed a "paycheck
protection" amendment designed to dissolve union support for the bill. Id. Last, Senator Frist
introduced a crafty amendment that, if passed, would have made the bill "nonseverable,"
meaning that the whole bill would be discarded if any part of it was ruled unconstitutional. Id.
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Campaign Reform Act of 2001.175 The centerpiece of the Act of 2001
was a ban on soft money.176 Specifically, the legislation would ban soft
money by prohibiting the transfer of funds from national to state or
local political parties, thus subjecting amounts spent by state or local
political parties for "federal election activity" to the limitations of the
FECA.177 Most importantly, the bill defined "federal election activity"
broadly to incorporate a number of state and local activities that were
immune from federal regulation.178 The bill likewise provided for (1)
an increase in hard money contribution limits; 179 (2) restrictions on so-
called "phony issue ads" that prohibited corporate and union spending
on advertisements that mention federal candidates within sixty days
of a general election and thirty days of a primary; (3) an increase in
reporting and disclosure requirements; (4) guidelines for determining
what constitutes "coordinated" spending by outside groups with
candidates; and (5) prohibitions on political fundraising on federal
175. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001).
176. For comparison purposes, the earlier versions had three major provisions: (1) all
contributions to national political parties comply with the current restrictions on hard money
contributions in the FECA; (2) prohibition on soft money spending from state and local parties on
any activity that might affect a federal election; and (3) a prohibition on political parties
fundraising for, or transferring money to, nonprofit organizations. See Feingold, supra note 10, at
383-84 (describing the primary features of the McCain-Feingold bill).
177. See S. 27, § 101(a)-(b).
178. See id.
179. New hard money limits proposed by the Act of 2001:
Center for Responsive Politics, Campaign Finance Reform: New Hard Money Limits Proposed by
McCain-Feingold Bill, at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/campaignfinance/fein-steinthompson.
asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2001).
Type of Contribution Current Limit Proposed Limit
Individual to $1,000 per election $2,000 per election, to
candidate be indexed for inflation
Individual to PAC $5,000 per year Same
Individual to state or $5,000 per year $10,000 per year
local party committee
Individual to national $20,000 per year $25,000 per year, to be
party committee indexed for inflation
Aggregate individual $25,000 per year $37,500 per year, to be
contribution to indexed for inflation
candidates, parties,
and PACs
Party committee to $17,500 per $35,000 per campaign,
candidate campaign to be indexed for
inflation
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property, contributions by foreign nationals, and candidates' use of
campaign funds for their own benefit.18 0
The issue then went to the House of Representatives, which on
two previous occasions had passed similar reform proposals, both
entitled the Shays-Meehan bill.18' In July 2001, the House was
scheduled to consider a pair of competing campaign finance reform
proposals, the Shays-Meehan bill and a proposal put forth by
Representatives Robert Ney and Albert Wynn.182 The primary
differences between the two bills were that the Shays-Meehan bill
would ban all soft money contributions and limit issue ads paid for by
outside groups, while the Ney-Wynn proposal would cap soft money
contributions at $75,000 and place no prohibitions on issue ads. 8 3
180. See S. 27, §§ 101-304 (outlining provisions of the bill); see also Press Release, Office of
Senator John McCain, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 (McCain-Feingold-Cochran)
Section by Section Analysis, at http://www.senate.gov/-mccain/cfrsecxsec.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2001) (n.d.) (describing provisions of the bill).
181. The 2001 version of the bill was reintroduced in the House on January 31, 2001. Similar
to the Act of 2001, the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 prohibited the
solicitation of soft money by political parties, increased the contribution limit for state
committees of political parties, prohibited a committee of a political party from making both
coordinated and independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate following their nomination,
and required coordinated activity to be considered a contribution to the candidate and an
expenditure by the candidate. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 380, 107th
Cong. (2001). In 1999, the House passed a similar bill by a vote of 252-177.
182. Juliet Eilperin & Helen Dewar, Campaign Bill Heads for a Vote in House, WASH. POST,
Jan. 25, 2002, at Al.
183. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 47. Specifically, summarized below is a
comparison of the major provisions of the competing proposals:
Current Law Shays-Meehan Bill Ney-Wynn Bill
Soft Money Unlimited. Bans all soft money. Caps soft money
contributions to
$75,000 per year.
Hard Money - $1,000 per $1,000 to House; Retains current
individuals to election to any $2,000 to President limits.
candidates federal and Senate
candidate, candidates.
Hard Money - $25,000 $37,500 $37,500. Exempts
annual individual amounts to national
limits to political parties.
parties, PACs, and
candidates
Issue Ads - run No prohibition Prohibits "issue ads" No prohibition.
independently of, on who can shortly before an Toughens disclosure
not coordinated pay for "issue election when paid for laws for broadcast
with, an individual ads" or when by corporations and and non-broadcast
campaign they can run. unions. Also communications.
strengthens disclosure
rules.
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However, due to the combination of interest group pressure and a
disagreement over the rules for debate, the Shays-Meehan bill stalled
in the House Rules Committee and the reform movement lost
momentum.184
Several months later, Senator McCain finally got the scandal
worthy of pushing campaign finance reform over the top. The fallout
from the Enron bankruptcy scandal put the national spotlight on
potential abuses in the campaign finance system and provided the
catalyst for reopening the campaign finance debate.18 5 Following the
defeat of two rival bills and a series of amendments, on February 14,
2002, the House approved 240-189186 the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform of 2002 ("Act of 2002").187 A month later, the Senate
voted 60-40 to send the legislation to President Bush for his
signature.188 The Act of 2002 is nearly identical to the Act of 2001,189
and is scheduled to take effect following the November 2002
elections.190  Shortly after passage, Senator Mitch McConnell
reiterated his intentions to challenge the Act of 2002 in the federal
courts.191 On March 27, 2002, immediately following President Bush's
private signing of the legislation, Senator McConnell's legal team192
launched the next stage of the campaign finance battle by filing a
Id.
184. Center for Responsive Politics, Tracking the Payback-Campaign Finance Reform, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid=CFR (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
185. See Juliet Eilperin & Helen Dewar, House Passes Campaign Finance Bill, WASH. POST,
Feb. 14, 2002.
186. Helen Dewar & Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Reform Momentum Builds, WASH. POST, Feb.
15, 2002, at Al.
187. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. (2002).
188. Helen Dewar, Campaign Reform Wins Final Approval, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at
Al (indicating that President Bush will sign the "flawed" legislation despite "present[ing] some
legitimate constitutional questions"). President Bush signed the legislation into law on March
27, 2002.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 158-64.
190. See § 402. This delay in the effective date has prompted leaders of both political parties
to launch "all-out, last chance" drives to raise millions of dollars in soft money. Juliet Eilperin,
Parties Racing to Bag Last of 'Soft Money; WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, at A2. For instance, Terry
McAuliffe, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, is promising potential donors
some of the perks they would traditionally receive during a presidential campaign, such as
access to exclusive receptions at the 2004 Democratic convention, in exchange for large soft
money contributions now. Id.
191. See Dewar, supra note 188. Campaign finance reform opponents believe that the
Supreme Court will have the final say on the validity of a soft money ban. See Charles Lane,
Court Backs Limits on Campaign Spending; Justices Cite Need to Curb 'Hard Money'
Contributions, WASH. POST, June 26, 2001, at Al.
192. Senator McConnell's "dream team" of attorneys includes former Independent Counsel
Kenneth W. Starr and First Amendment specialist Floyd Abrams. Charles Lane, Campaign
Finance Fight Not Over, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at A4.
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lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
challenging the constitutionality of the new law.193
Reaction to the Act of 2002 has been strong from both sides of
the aisle. Opponents in the House and Senate maintain that the soft
money ban and issue advertisement prohibitions are an
unconstitutional restriction of free speech. 194 In particular, critics
believe that the soft money ban will severely limit the role of political
parties in the democratic process, 195 and the limitations on issue ads
will reduce voter turnout, create -less competitive campaigns, and
proliferate single-issue congressional campaigns.1 96 Alternatively, the
proponents rely on a broad reading of Buckley v. Valeo 97 and an
endorsement from one hundred and twenty-six constitutional
scholars 98 to bolster their contention that the campaign finance
restrictions in the Act of 2002 are constitutional.1 99 According to FEC
Commissioner Bradley Smith, the biggest effect of new regulations
193. Id. The legal team plans to argue that the Act of 2002 violates the First Amendment's
protection of free speech and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it restricts the political speech of political parties and interest groups, but not the news media.
See id. As of April 19, 2002, a total of three lawsuits have been filed challenging the Act's
constitutionality. Marcia Coyle, Squaring Off Over Campaign Finance, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 2002.
194. See Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 620, 635 (2000) (mentioning that one constitutional argument against a soft money ban
is to the extent that soft money is used to fund issue advocacy (political speech immune from
regulation), the contributions that fund such spending must be constitutionally protected as
well).
195 See Dante Chinni, The Future Path of Soft Money, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2001, at 1
(suggesting political parties are the latest addition to the endangered species list).
196. LaRaja, supra note 169.
197. See Feingold, supra note 10, at 384 (relying upon the Court's holding that restrictions
on the source and size of contributions to candidates are permissible in order to protect the
electoral system from corruption or the appearance of corruption).
198. See Letter from the Brennan Center for Justice to Senators John McCain and Russell
Feingold (Sept. 22, 1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S10,105 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997). Taken
in context, the letter is not a ringing recommendation for the Act of 2002. First, the letter was
written in 1997 and specifically addressed two provisions of S. 25, the 1997 version of the
McCain-Feingold bill. Id. Second, the authors qualified their analysis in the opening paragraph
by stating, "Nor are we endorsing every aspect of the bill's soft money and voluntary spending
limits provisions." Id. Lastly, their endorsement of limiting contributions to political parties rests
upon "combating the appearance and reality of corruption" developed in "Buckley and its
progeny." Id. However, "Buckley and its progeny" have evolved significantly since 1997, and
lower federal courts have begun to question if the corruption rationale actually applies to
contributions to political parties. See Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F. Supp. 2d 881, 893 (D. Alaska
2001) (holding state campaign finance statute unconstitutional in attempting to limit donations
to political parties for a purpose other than influencing the nomination or election of a candidate,
or any limit on volunteer services).
199. See also Long, supra note 156, at 1190 (arguing that the First Amendment is not
violated because an individual can still express his or her views about a particular federal
candidate by contributing directly to the candidate's campaign under the FECA's limits or by
purchasing his or her own ads).
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could be a weaker separation between parties, candidates, and special
interests-the exact opposite of the bill's intention.200 Supporters
counter that an increase in the hard money contribution limits will
more than offset any negative effects from the elimination of soft
money. 20 1 Interestingly, politicians on both sides of the issue believe
that soft money will ultimately find another way into the system,
whether it is through independent expenditures, new PACs, quasi-
party organizations, 20 2  or some yet to be created financing
mechanism. 20 3
C. Interest Group Competition and the Collapse of Campaign
Finance Reform
In Friedrich Hayek's Road to Serfdom, he explained that
central economic planning becomes more difficult as an economy
becomes increasingly complex, in part because planners at the center
become increasingly incapable of obtaining and processing needed
information. 204 In 1971, and again in 1974, Congress "centralized" the
running for federal office with the enactment of the FECA and the
creation of the FEC.20 5 In 1976, the Supreme Court passed judgment
on the FECA in Buckley v. Valeo and established the contribution
versus expenditure distinction still relied upon today.20 6 Since that
time, federal campaigns and the issues surrounding campaign finance
200. Chinni, supra note 195 (discussing FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith's opinion of the
effect of a soft money ban).
201. See Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. § 102
(2002). But see Center for Responsive Politics, The Shell Game: The Potential Consequences of
McCain-Feingold, at http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/alertv614.asp (last visited Oct. 15,
2001) (reporting that coordinated hard money contributions from individual donors were a
powerful financing tool for President Bush's campaign and suggesting that this type of bundling
could replace the reliance on soft money for some candidates).
202. Many analysts agree that political parties will work more closely with interest groups to
create quasi-party organizations that essentially fulfill the soft money role of the parties but are
much more closely associated with specific interests. Chinni, supra note 195 (suggesting that "as
a result, even more money could end up pouring into quasi-party groups that have even less
accountability than the parties themselves").
203. For instance, the amount of independent expenditures ads purchased by outside groups
has significantly increased since soft money came under attack. Justin A. Nelson, Note, The
Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 541 (2000). Even
some Democratic supporters, such as Senator Robert G. Torricelli of New Jersey, worry that a
soft money ban alone would simply shift such donations to issue advertisements. Eric Schmitt,
Senate Democrats Win Virtual Guarantee of Test Votes on Campaign Finance Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1999, at Al.
204. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 35-37 (1944).
205. See supra Part III.A.1.
206. See 424 U.S. 1, 12-59 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that the FECA's contribution limits
were constitutional and that the FECA's expenditure limits violated the First Amendment).
1272
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
regulations have become increasingly complicated. As "planners"
struggled to maintain legislative control over campaigns and elections,
interest groups with specific agendas have become the primary
sources for information. Congress's increased reliance on interest
groups' information and campaign contributions has fostered the
groups' ability to compete for campaign finance legislation and thwart
legislators' attempts to benefit the public interest through meaningful
campaign finance reform.
1. The Players in the Campaign Finance Debate: Making Friends
Out of Enemies
Pundits have long remarked that "politics makes strange
bedfellows," and the issue of campaign finance reform was no
exception. 20 7 As the debate over the campaign finance reform debate
recommenced in the summer of 2001, an odd coalition of interest
groups, including the American Federation of Labor, American Civil
Liberties Union, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Christian Coalition,
National Rifle Association, National Association of Manufacturers,
and several others, came together with Senator Mitch McConnell to
announce their formal opposition to the bill.20 8 Specifically, the groups
opposed the limitations on issue ads funded by external groups
because the restrictions would have an adverse impact on their ability
to communicate with the public. 20 9 These groups also opposed the soft
money ban because they believed it would infringe upon their
constitutionally protected free speech rights as political
contributors. 210 Not surprisingly, these groups were among the largest
soft money donors and spenders on issue advertising during the 1999-
2000 election cycle.211
207. Center for Responsive Politics, Campaign Finance Reform: The Issue, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/campaignfinance/index.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
208. Id. In the House of Representatives, Majority Whip Tom DeLay led the group of
legislators opposed to comprehensive campaign finance reform. Id.
209. The particular provisions are a ban on ads paid for by outside groups that identify a
specific candidate within sixty days of a general election and increased disclosure requirements
for anyone spending more than $10,000 a year on television ads to disclose who paid for them.
Center for Responsive Politics, Strange Bedfellows: A Look at the Lobbying Behind the Campaign
Finance Debate, at http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/alertv6_lO.asp (last visited Mar. 24,
2002).
210. Id.
211. The University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg Public Policy Center reported that
following Super Tuesday in 2000, the AFL-CIO spent $9.5 million on issue advertising, while the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $6 million, and the National Rifle Association spent $1.6
million. Id. The leading soft money contributor was the National Rifle Association with nearly
$1.5 million all to Republicans, while the AFL-CIO and other labor unions contributed more than
$30 million in soft money, ninety-eight percent to Democrats. Center for Responsive Politics, Top
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On the other side of the issue, interest groups such as Common
Cause, Democracy 21, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and New York
University's Brennan Center for Justice have long pressed for
legislation similar to the Act of 2002.212 Similar to Senators McCain
and Feingold, these groups believe that reform is necessary because
voter concerns have been usurped by the money and influence of
powerful industries and interest groups. 213 Unlike the organizations
opposed to campaign finance reform, these groups do not have
significant financial resources to influence members of Congress
directly.214 Instead, they rely upon a combination of grassroots
mobilization and individual lobbying efforts to push for campaign
finance reform. 215 Long associated with Democratic causes, these
organizations have also been successful in influencing Republicans.
For instance, FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith suggested that
Senator McCain and his office "take their marching orders from Scott
Harshbarger," the president of Common Cause. 216
Also weighing in on the campaign finance reform debate are
"nonpartisan" interest groups providing disclosure and research
resources. These groups include the University of Pennsylvania's
Annenberg Public Policy Center, Center for Responsive Politics,
Campaign Finance Institute, Center for Public Integrity, Interfaith
Alliance, and Project Vote Smart.217 Such organizations are generally
reliable as nonbiased sources of information, but often their agendas
are revealed in subtle ways. 218
Soft Money Donors: 2000 Election Cycle, at http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/asp/soft-top.
asp?txtCycle=2000&txtSort=amnt (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
212. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 207.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Common Cause, Common Cause: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.
commoncause.org/about/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (indicating that "Common Cause is
funded through member dues and contributions. Member dues and contributions of $100 or less
provide approximately 84% of all income; contributions of over $1,000 provide approximately 5%.
Common Cause accepts no government grants. The Common Cause Governing Board has
adopted a policy of not accepting any monetary contributions from corporations or labor unions
in excess of $100 in a calendar year").
215. See, e.g., Common Cause, About Common Cause, at http://www.commoncause.org/about/
today.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (suggesting Common Cause was created as a "movement
propelled by the focused and concerted grassroots lobbying activities of Common Cause members
and reinforced with professional lobbying on Capitol Hill").
216. Steven Weiss, Commissioner of Controversy, CAP. EYE (Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Washington, D.C.), Summer 2000, at 2, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/newsletter/cc72/
03interview.asp.
217. For more information on these organizations and the information they provide, see
Center for Responsive Politics, Links: National Disclosure and Research Resources, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/basics/links/disclosure.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
218. See, e.g., Press Release, The Annenberg Public Policy Center, Annenberg Public Policy
Center Tracks over $509 Million in Reported Expenditures on Issue Advocacy (Feb. 1, 2001) (on
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2. Interest Group Theory at Work in the Summer of 2001
As described in Part II, interest group theory suggests that the
political marketplace is subject to competitive pressures just like the
private marketplace. In short, bills are "sold" by the legislature and
"bought" by the beneficiaries of legislation.219 The marketplace for
campaign finance legislation in the summer of 2001 was no exception.
Following the passage of the Act of 2001 in the Senate, opponents of
campaign finance reform scrambled to create an alternative to the
Shays-Meehan bill in the House. Interest groups and Republican
leaders targeted Representative Robert Ney to be the facilitator of a
compromise package. 220 As Chairman of the House Administration
Committee, Representative Ney was in an ideal position to control the
pace and outcome of the debate. 221 His proposal, while advancing some
level of reform, contained provisions that appealed predominantly to
those opposed to campaign finance reform. 222 Representative Ney also
recruited a key cosponsor, Representative Albert Wynn, who, along
with approximately fifteen members of the Congressional Black
Caucus ("CBC"), were instrumental in burying the Shays-Meehan
bill.223 In exchange for their efforts and a few days of critical media
coverage, the reelection campaign funds of Representatives Ney and
Wynn were handsomely rewarded. 224
file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (including comments from Kathleen Hall Jamieson questioning
the amount and content of issue ads); Press Release, Center for Responsive Politics, CRP to
Launch FEC Watch Project (Dec. 3, 2001) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (creating new
project to monitor enforcement activities of FEC and other government entities, including the
U.S. Department of Justice, and will "aggressively" seek to have those entities enforce the law).
219. For instance, imagine a simple supply and demand curve with Price ("P") of campaign
finance reform on the y-axis and Quantity ("Q") of cainpaign finance legislation on the x-axis.
The demand for campaign finance reform curve represents interest groups' demand for
legislation, while the supply of campaign finance legislation curve reflects the amount of
legislation offered by legislators. The equilibrium point represents the optimal amount of
campaign finance reform legislation demanded and offered. At that P and Q, interest groups are
willing to pay the "price" of achieving some type of reform, and legislators are willing to offer
that level of reform.
220. See Janet Hook, Democrats Try to Keep Campaign Reform Package Intact, L.A. TIMES,
June 29, 2001, at A20.
221. Representative Ney held hearings on campaign finance reform in the spring and
subsequently introduced his own bill, which he intended as a compromise to the Shays-Meehan
proposal. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 207.
222. Specifically, the Ney bill did not ban soft money, but instead capped soft money
contributions at $75,000 per year per organization. See supra note 221. In addition, and arguably
most important to the interest groups lobbying against the Act, the proposal did not contain any
prohibition on issue ads funded by external groups. See supra note 221.
223. David S. Broder, Different Chamber, Familiar Burial, WASH. POST, July 13, 2001, at Al;
see also Albert R. Wynn, Why I Oppose Shays-Meehan, WASH. POST, July 12, 2001, at A27.
224. For example, as of October 1, 2001, Representative Wynn had received $48,000 in PAC
contributions from Lawyers/Lobbyists and Labor groups. Center for Responsive Politics, PAC
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Interest group theory also suggests that legislative behavior is
driven by one primary goal-the representative's desire to get
reelected. 225 This desire can also be understood as each political
party's hope to remain in power or ascend to the majority. In the 1999-
2000 election cycle, the Democratic and Republican parties combined
to raise a record $1.24 billion.226 Of that total, Republicans raised
$465.8 million in hard money, compared to $275.2 million by the
Democrats. 227 In the race for unregulated soft money contributions, for
the first time, Republicans and Democrats were nearly even, having
raised $249.9 million and $245.2 million, respectively. 228 In fact, the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee raised $50 million in soft
money, compared to only $41 million for the National Republican
Senatorial Campaign Committee. 229 These figures were released by
the FEC shortly before the Senate's passage of the Act and were not
fully digested until the issue reached the House. Interest groups
aggressively used these figures to lobby undecided House members
that a soft money ban would either help or hinder their respective
political party and implicitly their own chances for reelection.230
In addition, interest group theory proposes that to procure
beneficial legislation, interest groups need to target those legislators
who are opposed to their position at the margin. 231 An example of
interest groups' ability to affect legislators at the margin was the
intense lobbying of Republican moderates, the CBC, and several
Hispanic members in the final days of the House debate on the Act of
Contributions to Albert R. Wynn (D-Md), at http://www.opensecrets.org/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2002). Of that total, $31,500 was received in May and June 2001. Id. Similarly, Representative
Ney has received $40,750 in PAC contributions from Lawyers/Lobbyists and Labor groups.
Center for Responsive Politics, PAC Contributions to Bob Ney (R-Ohio), at
http://www.opensecrets.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). Of that amount, $18,500 was received in
May and June 2001. Id. Representative Ney has also received $2,000 from the National Rifle
Association as of October 1, 2001. Id.
225. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 638-39 (1995).
226. Center for Responsive Politics, Campaign Finance Reform: What's the Issue, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/campaignfinance/index.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (citing
Federal Election Commission statistics).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Democrats Wear Soft-Money Crown, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2001, at A3.
230. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, New Campaign Finance Bills Offered in House; Two Sides
Focus on Key Blocs: GOP Moderates and Congressional Black Caucus, WASH. POST, June 29,
2001, at A13 (indicating that some Congressional Black Caucus members were concerned about
the national party having resources available to mount get-out-the-vote efforts). .
231. See Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565,
1569-73 (1995) (explaining the concepts behind interest group theory).
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2001.232 Interest groups, such as Common Cause and the National
Rifle Association, bought newspaper advertisements, set up telephone
banks, and blitzed the country with faxes, e-mails, and other
communications to sway these pivotal members. 233  Led by
Representative Wynn, head of the CBC's task force on campaign
finance reform, supporters of the Ney bill successfully swayed one-
third of the CBC to oppose the Shays-Meehan proposal.234 In
particular, Representative Wynn argued that an outright ban on soft
money would inhibit the ability of the Democratic Party and outside
groups to orchestrate voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives
and that increases in hard money contribution limits would have an
adverse impact on minority politicians whose constituents could not
contribute at that level.235 The effect of the margin lobbying will never
be fully known as neither the Shays-Meehan nor the Ney-Wynn
proposals were ever put to a vote.236 Instead, the campaign finance
reform debate in the summer of 2001 bitterly collapsed when the
House voted 228 to 203 to reject the Republican leadership's proposed
rules for debate between the two versions of reform. 237
Looking back at the campaign finance debate of the summer of
2001, several things are evident. First, interest group competition
successfully produced several pieces of legislation designed to promote
private over public concerns. 238  Second, those interest groups
232. Helen Dewar & Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Reform Lacks Votes; Backers Try to Attract
Hill Minorities, GOP Moderates to Bill, WASH. POST, July 12, 2001, at Al.
233. Id. Common Cause indicated they worked around the clock, while the National Rifle
Association let it be known that it would use the campaign finance vote as one measure in rating
members of Congress for the 2002 elections. Id.
234. Broder, supra note 223.
235. Darryl Fears, Keys to a Campaign Bill; Divided Black Caucus Is Heavily Lobbied,
WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at Al; see also Wynn, supra note 223.
236. See Juliet Eilperin & Helen Dewar, Campaign Bill Heads for a Vote in House, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at A01 (indicating the vote scheduled for July 2001 never took place).
237. See Broder, supra note 223; see also Helen Dewar & Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Reform
Bill Stalls; House GOP Leaders Shelve Measure After Losing Procedural Vote, WASH. POST, July
13, 2001, at A01. The Republican leaders' plan would have required fourteen separate votes on
the changes Representatives Shays and Meehan wished to make to their bill to broaden support
for it. Id. Nineteen Republicans joined 208 Democrats in defeating the proposed procedural rules,
while one Democrat joined the remaining Republicans. Id. After losing his first procedural vote
as Speaker of the House, Representative Hastert stated, "Right now, I have no plans to bring up
this bill. I'm going to step back and assess the whole thing." Id. Supporters of the Shays-Meehan
bill vowed to bring the issue to the House floor, even if it took a discharge petition by which a
majority of members can force a vote when the House leadership refuses to act. Id.
238 Interest groups that lost their battle in the Senate continued their struggle when
the debate recommenced in the House. See Holly Bailey, The Ad Busters: Broadcasters and
Campaign Finance Reform, Feb. 13, 2002, at http://www.opensecrets.org/a-
lerts/v6/alerts6_41.asp. For instance, television and radio stations, represented by the
National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB"), were successful in stripping language in the
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determined to derail campaign finance reform used their resources
effectively and ended the debate, albeit temporarily. Lastly, despite
the rhetoric, political parties and members of Congress continued to
raise soft money at an unprecedented level. For instance, contribution
totals for 2001 reveal that Republican Party committees raised $100.1
million in soft money, while the Democrats raised $68.6 million. 239 In
addition, Republicans continued to dominate the area of hard money
fundraising, collecting $131 million in 2001, compared to only $59.6
million by the Democrats. 240 These figures suggest that even though
members of Congress were advocating reform, they had no intention of
reforming themselves. 241 In the alternative, Congress could eliminate
interest group competition for comprehensive campaign finance
reform by encouraging candidates to regulate themselves through
private agreements. As the next part demonstrates, voluntary
campaign finance agreements could be a viable alternative to
government-imposed campaign finance reform.
IV. THE SOLUTION: VOLUNTARY CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
THROUGH PRIVATE AGREEMENTS
A. What Is a Voluntary Campaign Finance Agreement?
Perhaps the best way to define a voluntary campaign finance
agreement is by describing what it is not. First, a voluntary
agreement is not a government-induced scheme where the government
offers a benefit in exchange for the candidate's acceptance of
restrictions. 242 The most common example of a government-induced
agreement is the government financing system for presidential
elections established by the FECA of 1971.243 The primary purpose of
Shays-Meehan bill that would make television ads cheaper for politicians to purchase. Id.
The provision was inserted in the Act of 2001 by Senator Robert Torricelli, and prompted
the NAB to begin lobbying various House members and make significant contributions to
various Republican and Democrat campaign committees. Id.
239. Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money's Impact at a Glance, at http://www.open
secrets.org/parties/softglance.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Sharon Theimer, Dems May Get Soft-Money Break, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov.
29, 2001 (reporting Democratic National Committee's request to the FEC to extend the amount
of time it had to cover operating expenses using soft money campaign contributions).
242. John Copeland Nagle, Voluntary Campaign Finance Reform, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1809,
1815 (2001).
243. Id. at 1817. Most presidential candidates have agreed to the presidential funding
scheme since it was first offered in 1976. Id. at 1828. Under this system, major presidential
candidates are entitled to as much as $70 million in public funds in exchange for their pledge not
to spend more than the government provides them. Id. at 1817. Interestingly, President Bush
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government-induced plans is to control candidates' total campaign
expenditures 244 Second, voluntary agreements are not comparable to
international deals on exchange rates or nuclear arms disarmament.
While often decided by informal agreements or oral bargains, these
arrangements typically have the support of some type of government
entity.245 Purely voluntary, agreements, on the other hand, are
developed and consummated without any type of government
action.246 Therefore, voluntary campaign finance agreements might
best be described as private agreements among candidates that
balance the competing public and private concerns over various
campaign finance issues.247
The structure of any voluntary agreement begins with an
existing legal framework, namely federal and state campaign finance
regulations and judicial interpretations of those regulations. The
agreements are intended to supplement existing legal obligations and
typically develop in response to media pressure, 'candidate challenge,
or fear of electoral rebuke.248 The benefits of voluntary agreements
over campaign finance legislation are very similar to those achieved in
the private marketplace. By acting rationally and bargaining with one
another, candidates are able to achieve a level of efficiency
unattainable through government regulation. Specifically, voluntary
agreements allow candidates to: (1) respond to the specific demands of
their electorate; (2) establish restrictions that each believes are
enforceable; (3) authorize a nonpartisan source to report infractions;
and (4) provide flexibility to adapt to the latest perceived evil of
campaign finance. 249 Nevertheless, voluntary agreements also present
a number of costs, including problems with monitoring and
enforcement. Most importantly, competing candidates who create
declined to participate in public financing program in the 2000 presidential election. Id. at 1829.
Beyond direct campaign funding, other government inducements to reduce candidate
expenditures have included free television time, tax credits, franking privileges, statements in
official voter guides, notations on the ballot, and reduced reporting requirements. Id. at 1816.
244. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per curiam) (sustaining the public
financing system and the conditioning of public funds upon an agreement by the candidate to
limit their total expenditures).
245. Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements.Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495,
495-96 (1991) (describing informal monetary agreements and the reliance on unspoken
understandings between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union).
246. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1815.
247. See id. at 1830 (describing voluntary agreements as formalization of ad hoc decisions in
response to campaign finance concerns).
248. Id. at 1815.
249. See id. at 1839 (discussing the benefits of voluntary campaign finance agreements).
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effective voluntary agreements must overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma
to encourage their proliferation.250
This Note does not suggest that there is an ideal form for a
voluntary campaign finance agreement. Instead, it seeks to illustrate
the benefits of voluntary agreements and how they can accurately
balance candidate and electoral preferences to serve the public
interest.251 The following section describes five voluntary agreements
and the relative successes and failures of each. While the agreements
were designed to fit the needs of a particular campaign, they contain
similarities that could act as models for structuring future voluntary
agreements. Nonetheless, voluntary agreements remain the exception
and not the rule. 252 This Note concludes with a discussion of how to
encourage the development of voluntary agreements through social
norms.
B. Success and Failure of Recent Voluntary Campaign Finance
Agreements
1. 1996 Massachusetts Senate Campaign: Senator John Kerry (D)
v. Governor William Weld (R)
One of the first voluntary campaign finance agreements
involving a federal election occurred in the 1996 Massachusetts
Senate race. In response to political pressure to limit campaign
expenditures, 253 Senator Kerry and Governor Weld, in August of 1996,
entered into a relatively successful agreement that capped total
250. See id. at 1830, 1839 (noting the promise and limitations of purely voluntary campaign
finance agreements); see also discussion supra Part II.C (discussing Prisoner's Dilemma).
251. Interestingly, lawmakers often claim that public financing of elections is the ultimate
solution to the campaign finance crisis and would best effectuate the national interest. While
several states have experimented with public financing of elections, the citizens of Missouri
recently voted down a public financing scheme by a 2-1 margin. Terry Ganey, Missourians Reject
Public Financing of Election Campaigns; Proposal to Restrict Billboards Appeared to Pass, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2000, at A15. In addition, the lack of support for public financing
of elections is demonstrated by the fact that only one in eight taxpayers elect on their tax returns
to pay the three dollars for the presidential campaign fund. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1840.
252. For instance, for every voluntary agreement in the last three Senate election years,
there were more than thirty other Senate races where no agreement was reached. Nagle, supra
note 242, at 1837.
253. In 1996, Massachusetts's voters were concerned with the amount of money pouring into
campaigns for elected office. See generally Francis X. Clines, Most Doubt a Resolve to Change
Campaign Financing, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at A5 (finding that three in four
respondents expressed agreement with the statement that "many public officials make or change
policy decisions as a result of money they receive from major contributors"). Massachusetts's
voters also expressed their desire for reform by passing a comprehensive ballot initiative on
campaign finance reform. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 55A, §§ 2851-2856 (1998).
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campaign spending after July 1 at $6.9 million per candidate. 254 The
agreement specified that media spending could constitute $5 million of
total expenditures and the candidates could only use $500,000 of their
own money in the campaign. 255 In addition, political parties were
limited to spending $600,000 on behalf of their candidates, and only
$2 million in soft money could be directed at the campaign.256 Most
significantly, spending by outside groups such as corporations, unions,
and interest groups counted against the $6.9 million cap.25 7
The agreement proved effective until the waning days of the
campaign when Senator Kerry charged that the Governor Weld
breached the agreement by exceeding the $5 million cap on media
spending. 258 Senator Kerry argued that the $5 million cap included a
fifteen percent buyer's fee, so that the total amount spent on
advertisements would not exceed $4.25 million for each candidate.25 9
Governor Weld disagreed that the cap accounted for a fifteen percent
buyer's fee, especially since he had been able to negotiate a lower
buyer's fee and consequently spent more than the total amount on
advertisements. 260 Governor Weld then filed suit in federal court
alleging that Senator Kerry breached the $500,000 cap on personal
campaign expenditures by securing a $400,000 loan on his home and
spending in excess of the cap.261 The suit was unsuccessful, and each
candidate publicly blamed the other for violating the agreement. 262 On
election day, Senator Kerry defeated Governor Weld fifty-two percent
to forty-five percent; it remains unclear as to how each candidate's
"breach" affected the outcome of the election. 263
2. The Minnesota Compact
At approximately the same time, interest groups in Minnesota
mounted a campaign to encourage voluntary campaign restrictions
that became known as the Minnesota Compact. In June 1995, Tom
254. Alliance for Better Campaigns, Case Study: The 1996 Massachusetts Senate Race, at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/documents/mags.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. This portion of the agreement proved the most effective as issue advertising by
outside groups was marginalized. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Biography of Senator John F. Kerry, in THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000, at
778 (Nat'l Journal Group, Inc. ed., 1999) (describing the election results from his 1996 Senate
race).
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Hamburger, Washington Bureau Chief of the Minneapolis Star
Tribune, challenged candidates to declare a cease-fire on television
attack ads and reinstate the tradition of debates and community
discussions, and suggested that news organizations commit to
covering the substance of political campaigns. 264  From these
comments, a coalition of academic, civic, business, and media groups
drafted what became known as the Minnesota Compact. 265 Promoted
and publicized during the 1996 and 1998 elections, the Compact is a
voluntary agreement that seeks to improve campaign discourse by
challenging candidates, news media, and citizens to meet their civic
duties.266 Specifically, it asks candidates to refrain from misleading
attacks and participate in substantive debates. 267 It requests the press
to identify and broadcast stories on voter concerns and deemphasize
predictions on election outcomes. 268 The Compact also encourages
citizens to discuss the issues and demand more from news media and
candidates. 269
The 1996 Minnesota Compact is often hailed as the most
comprehensive and effective voluntary campaign finance initiative to
date.270 For instance, two hundred and eighty-three candidates
seeking elected office in Minnesota signed onto the Compact for the
1996 elections. 271 Of those candidates, only five or six departed from
their agreement to run "clean" campaign ads. 272 In addition,
Minnesota's news media was effective in providing substantive
coverage of the issues and critically appraising the candidates'
campaign advertisements. 273 Unfortunately, only 65% of eligible voters
turned out to vote in 1996, down from 72% in 1992, 67% in 1988, and
264. Tom Hamburger, The Minnesota Compact, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 23, 1995, at
16A.
265. Alliance for Better Campaigns, Case Study: The Minnesota Compact, at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/documents/compact.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
266. Id.
267. Id. Planks #1 and #2 of the Minnesota Compact set forth standards for debates and a
code of conduct for campaign communications, referred to as the "Ten Commandments of Clean
Campaign Ads." THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, REPORT, NO. 22, THE MINNESOTA
COMPACT AND THE ELECTION OF 1996, at 27 (1998).
268. Alliance for Better Campaigns, supra note 265. Plank #3 of the Minnesota Compact
describes the role of journalists. THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, supra note 267, at 28.
269. Alliance for Better Campaigns, supra note 265. Plank #4 of the Minnesota Compact lays
out four suggestions of how citizens can actively participate in Minnesota elections. THE
ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, supra note 267, at 28-29.
270. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1836.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1840 n.128.
273. Id. at 17-23.
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69.5% in 1984.274 The lower turnout could be attributed to decreased
interest nationally in the 1996 presidential election or possibly to the
negative advertising that took place in Minnesota's Senate race, as
neither Senator Paul Wellstone nor his unsuccessful challenger, Rudy
Boschwitz, signed onto the Compact.275
3. Voluntary Reform at the Local Level: Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Voluntary campaign finance agreements have also sprung up
in local politics. For example, in 1995, citizen activists in Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, concerned by a recent increase in campaign spending,
large contributions by developers, and the success of pro-development
candidates in recent elections, promoted a voluntary campaign finance
reform program for local elections. 276 Aided by the North Carolina
Alliance for Democracy, the Green Party, and the Sierra Club, local
activists developed a package of reforms that included disclosure of all
contributions, spending limits of $4,000 for council candidates and
$7,000 for mayoral candidates, and contribution limits of $100.277 In
1995, four of the nine candidates for city council and one of the two
candidates for mayor agreed to the voluntary reform program. 278 Only
one of the pledging challengers was elected. 279 In 1997, the voluntary
program was again promoted, and four of the seven city council
candidates accepted the pledge. 280 Two of those candidates, one
incumbent and one challenger, were elected to the council. 281
The Chapel Hill voluntary reform program, similar to the
Minnesota Compact, utilized the media and public awareness
campaigns to pressure candidates into accepting the campaign finance
restrictions. 28 2 The proponents of the voluntary program felt their
efforts were successful when full disclosure of campaign contributions
became a significant issue and the local media began to run stories
about campaign contributors and overall campaign spending. 28 3 In
addition, as the data suggests, not only did a higher percentage of
candidates accept the pledge in 1997 but also a higher percentage of
274. Id. at 15.
275. See id.
276. The National Civic League, The New Politics Program, Recognizing and Promoting
Innovative Political Reforms, at http://www.ncl.org/ncl/nppsum.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. Id.
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those who accepted it won. 284 Realizing the limitations of the
legislative system, these reformers focused on a viable political issue
and presented a set of reforms that benefited the public as well as
several political candidates. 285
4. 1998 Wisconsin Senate Campaign: Senator Russell Feingold (D) v.
Representative Mark Neumann (R)
In 1998, two years following the Kerry-Weld agreement in
Massachusetts, Senator Feingold and Representative Neumann
entered into a comprehensive voluntary campaign finance
agreement. 286 Representative Neumann initially challenged Senator
Feingold to agree to four principles for managing their campaigns. 287
Two weeks later, Senator Feingold responded by issuing ten promises
to which he would hold while campaigning. 288 The "gentleman's
agreement" reached between the two candidates incorporated portions
of both proposals. Specifically, the voluntary pact included a one dollar
per voter spending cap,289 a requirement that no more than twenty-
five percent of their contributions come from outside of Wisconsin, a
limit of ten percent of their funds raised from PACs, a $2,000 ceiling
on the use of personal funds in the campaign, a prohibition on raising
soft money, 290 and full reporting of all contributions.29' Unlike the
1996 pact between Senator Kerry and Governor Weld, this agreement
did not restrict spending by outside interest groups or include their
expenditures in the candidate's total spending cap.292 Also in contrast
284. Id.
285. See id. In 1997, citizen groups in Boulder, Colorado promoted the Chapel Hill voluntary
reform program for their local elections. Id. The program had similar results with nine of twenty
candidates in the city council elections signing a pledge to limit campaign spending to $11,000
and not to accept contributions in excess of $100. Id.
286. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1832.
287. Representative Neumann signed a four-point pledge at a press conference at the state
capitol in Madison and challenged Senator Feingold to sign the same pledge. Alan J. Borsuk &
Richard P. Jones, Senate Rivals Offer Restraint in Campaign Spending, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 1998, at 1. Senator Feingold quickly responded by claiming that
Representative Neumann's pledge was an attempt to jump on the campaign finance reform train,
one of his central issues. Id.
288. See Nagle, supra note 242, at 1832 n.97.
289. In 1998, Wisconsin had 3.82 million eligible voters. FEC, Voter Registration and
Turnout-1998, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/reg&to98.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
290. Representative Neumann allowed the Republican Party to spend soft money on his
behalf, while Senator Feingold did not allow the Democratic Party to do the same. Alan J.
Borsuk, Soft Money Floods TV in Feingold-Neumann Race, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 16,
1998, at 1.
291. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1832.
292. See id.
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to the Kerry-Weld agreement, Senator Feingold and Representative
Neumann honored the terms of their agreement. 293 In November,
Wisconsin voters reelected Senator Feingold in one of the closest races
in the nation, fifty percent to forty-eight percent.294
5. 2000 New York Senate Campaign: First Lady Hilary Rodham
Clinton (D) v. Representative Rick Lazio (R)
Another example of a nonregulatory approach to campaign
finance reform, this time directly confronting the issue of soft money,
was a voluntary agreement between Representative Rick Lazio and
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton during the 2000 New York Senate
campaign. On September 24, 2000, after nearly seven weeks of
political posturing,295 the two candidates reached an agreement to
forgo the use of millions of dollars in soft money for advertising in the
New York Senate race.296 Specifically, the agreement barred the
candidate's use of soft money on radio and television advertisements
but allowed soft money expenditures for get-out-the-vote efforts and
direct mail. 297 In a significant departure from previous agreements,
Clinton and Lazio also expressly requested that twenty-six interest
groups not use soft money to pay for advertisements for or against
them. 298 The agreement did not bar the candidates from raising soft
293. See id. at 1833.
294. Wisconsin, in THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000, supra note 263, at 1726, 1726
(1999) (describing the razor-thin reelection of Senator Feingold over Representative Neumann).
295. Initially, Mrs. Clinton was the first to propose a voluntary agreement, but that
agreement was intended for her anticipated Republican opponent, New York Mayor Rudolph
Guiliani. See Nagle, supra note 242, at 1833. The Clinton-Lazio agreement came about after
Representative Lazio strode across the stage during a debate on September 13, 2000 and
demanded that Clinton sign an agreement that he had drafted. See id.
296. Dean E. Murphy, Candidates Back 'Soft Money' Ban in New York Race, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2000, at Al.
297. Jim Drinkard & Kathy Kiely, RevoltsThreaten Clinton-Lazio Cease-fire on Ads, USA
TODAY, Sept. 26, 2000, at 6A; see also Robert Hardt, Jr., Clinton and Lazio Skirted Soft-$ Ban
Here, N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 2001, at 9 (reporting that in the final two weeks of the campaign, the
candidates spent a combined $3.23 million on a variety of other campaign expenses).
298. Drinkard & Kiely, supra note 297. Representative Lazio requested that the American
Conservative Union, AmeriPAC, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Coalition for a Better America,
The Conservative Campaign Fund, The Conservative Leadership PAC, Conservatives for
Effective Leadership, ConnserveAmerica, National Conservative Campaign Fun, The Republican
Jewish Coalition, The Republican National Committee, The Republican Leadership Council,
RuffPac, and Save Our Senate abide by the agreement. Id. Mrs. Clinton requested that the AFL-
CIO, American Federation of Teachers, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Democratic
National Committee, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee, Liberal Party of New York, National Abortion and Reproductive Rights
Action League, National Education Association, New York Democratic Party, Planned
Parenthood, Sierra Club, and Working Families Party abide by the agreement. Id. Initially, the
AFL-CIO called this portion of the agreement "undemocratic and unworkable." Id. Nonetheless,
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money to help other candidates and their respective parties, but it did
require the use of hard money for the purchase of all radio and
television ads in the remaining six weeks of the campaign.299
Initially, observers had mixed reactions about the scope and
potential effectiveness of the voluntary agreement. For instance, the
candidates were praised for the ban on soft money expenditures for
advertisements because it spared the public from additional negative
propaganda and eliminated last minute large media buys from outside
groups. 300 In addition, one commentator suggested that the agreement
was "faithful to the true intent of our campaign finance laws ....
[a]nd it showed the power of the public's desire for clean elections."301
Alternatively, political analysts viewed the agreement as a tactical
attempt by Representative Lazio to salvage his campaign and a
potentially dangerous decision by First Lady Clinton.30 2 Supporters of
government-imposed campaign finance reform criticized the
agreement and compared its effectiveness to voluntary bans on toxic
dumping as an acceptable environmental solution.30 3 Whatever the
spin might have been, the voluntary agreement proved to be an
innovative and effective approach to lessening the impact of soft
money in a campaign.30 4 A study by the Brennan Center for Justice at
New York University Law School indicates that candidates and
interest groups abided by the agreement and that the candidates paid
for all ads run during the final six weeks of the campaign with hard
money.30 5 Nonetheless, the agreement's effect remains somewhat
unclear, as any apparent advantages to Representative Lazio in
entering the agreement were surpassed by First Lady Clinton as she
won handily, fifty-five percent to forty-three percent.30 6
once the agreement was signed, the groups held true to the agreement, possibly fearing any
backlash would damage their candidate. See Editorial, Hard Gains from Soft Money Ban, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2000, at 34.
299. Drinkard & Kiely, supra note 297.
300. Editorial, supra note 298.
301. Brennan Center: Sen.-Elect Clinton Benefited from Huge Soft Money Edge in NY Senate
Campaign, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 14, 2000 [hereinafter Brennan Center], 2000 WL 26852150.
302. See William Kristol & Jeffrey Bell, Soft Money Is No Longer an Advantage for the
Republican Party, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 29, 2000, at liB (indicating the soft money ban was a
victory for Representative Lazio because the Democratic senatorial campaign organization was
planning to spend a lot more soft money on television ads in New York).
303. Press Release,' Common Cause, Statement of Common Cause President Scott
Harshbarger on New York Senate Race Soft Money Deal (Sept. 25, 2000), at http://www.common
cause.org/publications/septOO/0925002.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
304. See Todd S. Purdum, Tea with Cher, and Other Stops on the Fund-Raising Trail, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2000, at B1.
305. Brennan Center, supra note 301.
306. The Senate: Results by State, NAT'L J., Nov. 11, 2000.
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C. Factors that Affect the Development of Voluntary Agreements
1. Looking Back: How Candidates Overcame the Prisoner's Dilemma
As discussed in Part II, law and economic scholars examine
promissory conventions on the basis of the consequences of
nonperformance. The consequentialist theory of free bargaining
suggests that inherent in every decision to contract is an individual
economic analysis of the costs and benefits of performance or
nonperformance. 30 7 The aforementioned examples of voluntary
campaign finance agreements indicate that perhaps the most
important factor in forming an agreement is a candidate's weighing of
the costs and benefits associated with failing to enter a proposed
agreement, or perhaps, the consequences of breaking an already
entered into agreement. 308 For example, by entering a voluntary
agreement, the candidate is undertaking a moral and political
obligation to perform. If the candidate chooses to breach the
agreement, he places his political capital as well as his reputation on
the line. In addition, if the candidate fails to respond to a proposed
agreement, he risks the loss of popular support and the chance that
his rebuke will haunt him for the rest of the campaign. In the Clinton-
Lazio agreement, Representative Lazio seized upon Mrs. Clinton's
earlier statements regarding campaign finance limitations and forced
her to enter some form of voluntary agreement.30 9. For Mrs. Clinton,
the benefits of continued soft money expenditures were evidently
outweighed by the cost of going back on her earlier remarks and
repudiating Representative Lazio's proposed agreement.
Related to the cost-benefit analysis is a candidate's
determination of how likely his or her opponent is to benefit from a
voluntary agreement. 310 Specifically, candidates will not enter into
agreements that they perceive to be a last-ditch effort by desperate
challengers. 3 1 For example, in the 2000 elections, Senator Richard
Lugar never responded to his opponent's proposed voluntary campaign
finance agreement because he correctly calculated that his reelection
was assured. 312 On the other hand, Representative Lazio approached
307. See supra Part III C.
308. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1838.
309. See supra note 285.
310. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1838.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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Mrs. Clinton when he was still a viable candidate, and a refusal to
negotiate could have been unfavorable to her campaign.
The specific provisions of a proposed agreement are another
important factor that encourage candidates to enter into some form of
voluntary agreement. Recall that Coase's insight-that transactions
are costly and sometimes prohibitively so-suggests that regulatory
efforts succeed only to the extent that rules are devised which fall in
line with the ex ante expectations of the affected parties.313 Similarly,
entering into a voluntary campaign finance agreement can be a
complex and costly transaction, particularly because the agreement
will affect the candidates' primary weapon in a campaign-the
resources to communicate to the electorate. Therefore, as
demonstrated by the voluntary agreement examples, only those
arrangements containing precise provisions were effective. 314 For
instance, the failure of the Kerry-Weld agreement can partly be
explained by the lack of a clear definition of what constituted total
media expenditures.31 5 Alternatively, the success of the Clinton-Lazio
agreement can be attributed to the careful attention to detail and an
understanding of what the agreement actually governed. 316
2. Looking Ahead: Issues that Could Affect the Structure of
Voluntary Agreements
As discussed previously, some of the primary benefits of
voluntary campaign finance agreements include their ability to
respond to electorate-specific campaign finance preferences, and exist
or not exist based upon the cost-benefit analysis of a particular
candidate. This section highlights several issues that could help bring
about voluntary agreements or provide justification as to why certain
components of the Act of 2002 would not be appropriate for particular
campaigns. The uncertain nature of political campaigns reveals that
voluntary campaign finance agreements should be preferred over
government-imposed campaign finance regulation because the
incentive for candidates to regulate their behavior is determined by
313. Stearns, supra note 24, at 713.
314. See Nagle, supra note 242, at 1838.
315. See id.
316. See Stephanie Saul & John Riley, A Divide on Soft-Money/Lazio, Clinton Camps Meet
on Ban, but Pact Is Doubted, NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 2000, at A6 (chronicling early negotiations on
an agreement and identifying the presence of election law experts at the meetings); see also
Hardt, supra note 297 (reporting that soft money was spent on other campaign expenditures,
including "production costs" for media guru, Mandy Grunwald, which were not a violation of the
agreement because it was not "buying TV airtime").
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the will of the voters, who can most effectively resolve what issues
matter the most.
One of the major goals of campaign finance reform is to ban the
use of unregulated soft money. 31 7 The recently passed Act of 2002 will
diminish the use of soft money by subjecting all contributions to
candidates and national political parties to the limitations and
regulations proscribed in the FECA. 318 Challengers seeking public
office will be greatly affected by this type of prohibition because
incumbents generally have a significant advantage over challengers in
raising funds from individuals, PACs, and political parties.319
Challengers, more so than incumbents, depend on resources from their
political parties to mount successful campaigns, and a soft money ban
will eliminate a critical source of their funding.320 Predictably,
incumbents acting in their own self-interest will generally seek to
enact legislation that increases their chances for reelection. Therefore,
an electorate that values the challenger's role in the political process
might prefer voluntary agreements (over new campaign finance
regulations) that allow the use of soft money and limit incumbents'
ability to enact self-serving regulation.
In 1986, former California Secretary of State March Fong Eu
described raising political donations as "the greatest barrier to the
election of more women." 321 According to a recent study, the barrier
remains high as the world of political contributors continues to be
dominated by men.322 In the 1999-2000 election cycle, women
contributed twenty-eight percent of all hard money given by
individuals and only fifteen percent of all soft money.3 23 Soft money
has become an important ally for female candidates, as they are
typically in need of strong party support to compete against male
317. Alison Mitchell, Vote Boosts McCain-Feingold; By 60-40, Senate Rejects Diluted Soft-
money Curb, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2001, at 1 (statement of Sen. Feingold).
318. See Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. (2002).
319. See, e.g., Press Release, Center for Responsive Politics, Women's Political Giving
Increasing, but Stagnant Compared to Giving by Men, Study of 2000 Election Financing Finds,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pressreleases/BigPicture2001.htm (Oct. 25, 2001)
(indicating that the cost of beating a House incumbent in 2000 increased to over $2 million,
nearly double what it cost two years earlier).
320. Bill Walsh, Campaign Bill Raises Limit on Donations; Amendments Said to Favor
Incumbents, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 31, 2001, at 1.
321. See Doug Brown, Women in Politics; Candidates Face Money Problems, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1986, at 1.
322. See Press Release, supra note 319 (discussing the results of a study entitled "The Big
Picture," which provide a comprehensive analysis of campaign spending in the 2000 election
cycle).
323. Id.
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candidates. 324 For these reasons, many female candidates oppose the
elimination of soft money.325 Mrs. Clinton's decision to enter a
voluntary soft money ban with Representative Lazio angered many
party loyalists and interest groups and was seen as financially
dangerous. 326 However, Mrs. Clinton was not the typical female
candidate since she benefited from a level of popularity and notoriety
unseen in female electoral politics. 3 27 Therefore, providing female
candidates with the flexibility to raise sufficient resources is another
reason the public might demand voluntary campaign finance
restrictions that could level the playing field between men and women.
Lastly, as seen in the Clinton-Lazio agreement, candidates
appear increasingly willing to enter into voluntary agreements that
seek to silence, or significantly limit, the influence of outside interest
groups. Similarly, the recently passed Act of 2002 contains restrictions
on communications by outside groups within a certain number of days
of a federal election. 328 These trends appear to be driven by the
public's perceived desire to limit negative issue advertisements and in
turn increase voter participation. Predictably, affected interest groups
have vigorously opposed voluntary agreements and legislative efforts
that limit their ability to communicate with voters. 29 Despite their
objections, interest groups involved with the Clinton-Lazio race
complied with the agreement for fear that their breach would have a
negative impact on their candidate.330 Somewhat ironically, policy
proposals that are seen by many as unconstitutional First Amendment
324. Jason P. Conti, The Money Chase: How Proposed Changes to Campaign Finance Laws
Could Impact Female Candidates, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 115 (2001) (reviewing
GLEANOR CLIFT & TOM BRAZAITIS, MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATTERING THE LAST GLASS CEILING
(2000)).
325. Id. at 115 n.59. Similarly, in the summer of 2001, several members of the Congressional
Black Caucus realized that an outright soft money ban would have an adverse impact on the
election chances of minority candidates. See Wynn, supra note 223. Specifically, a ban would
eliminate a critical resource in registering some of their constituents to vote and encouraging
them to get to the polls on election day. Id. Therefore, Representative Wynn joined with
Representative Ney in cosponsoring a bill that would cap soft money contributions at $75,000 per
group per year. See Campaign Reform and Citizen Participation Act of 2001, H.R. 2360, 107th
Cong. (2001).
326. See Kristol & Bell, supra note 302.
327. See Conti, supra note 324, at 115.
328. See Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. (2002).
Even if these new restrictions survive constitutional scrutiny, some commentators believe they
are inadequate to address innovations in campaign communications over the Internet. See Paul
A. Werner, Note, e-Pluribus Unum? The Problem of Anonymous Election-Related
Communications on the Internet: A Conceptual Methodology for Evaluating Regulatory
Interferences with Anonymous Speech, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 47, 51-53 (2002).
329. Drinkard & Kiely, supra note 297 (reporting that the AFL-CIO and other interest
groups threatened not to abide by the ban).
330. See supra note 305.
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restrictions can be enforced freely through voluntary campaign
finance agreements. This voluntary speech limitation underscores the
power of the electorate to control the type of information they receive
about a candidate.
D. Voluntary Agreements as a Social Norm
Soon after Representative Lazio and First Lady Clinton
reached their agreement to ban soft money in the New York Senate
campaign, Senator McCain suggested that the arrangement "should
be followed by every federal campaign in America. '331 However, no
other campaign took his advice. 332 The mystery is why this is the case.
As described in Part II, candidates considering a voluntary agreement
are confronted with the collective action problems of the Prisoner's
Dilemma. One possible nonregulatory method to overcome these
problems is the development of social campaign finance norms.
As described earlier, social norms are best understood as
patterns of rationally governed behavior.33 3 Of particular relevance to
the production of these patterns of behavior are the concepts of
reputation, signaling, and the existence of norm entrepreneurs. In the
context of campaign finance reform, and specifically the proposed ban
on soft money, two distinct social norm application questions are
relevant. First, are the mechanisms in place or do the forces exist in
society for voluntary campaign finance agreements to become a norm
within the campaign and elections community? Second, and more
specifically, as an alternative to voluntary agreements or legislation,
could politicians themselves develop a norm to resist soft money? The
answers to these questions might help predict whether Senator
McCain's suggestion of nationwide implementation of voluntary
campaign finance agreements might ever be realized.
1. Development of Voluntary Campaign Finance Agreements as a
Social Norm?
Similar to online privacy concerns, legislators have expressed
an intense desire to cure perceived corruptive electoral influences with
additional campaign finance restrictions. However, political
entrepreneurs superceded legislative efforts with creative self-
regulatory schemes designed to accommodate the public's expectations
331. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1839 (quoting Senate Report-New York: Vegas Odds on the
Ban Lasting, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 26, 2000, at 2), at http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/hotline).
332. Id.
333. Hetcher, supra note 97, at 6.
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of reasonable campaign finance limitations. 334 In Professor Steven
Hetcher's article, he suggests that formal agreements between website
operators, though desirable, were not necessary to developing an
online privacy norm.335 Instead, unilateral movements by privacy
activists to satisfy a consumer's demand for online privacy stimulated
the creation of new social norms.336 Similarly, this Note proposes that
unilateral movements by political candidates can serve to stimulate
the creation of social campaign finance norms. However, to overcome
the collective action problems associated with voluntary campaign
finance agreements, candidates must be encouraged to act in concert.
This leads to the question of how society should encourage these types
of bilateral movements.
As the voluntary agreement examples illustrate, there are
several norm entrepreneurs in the campaign finance marketplace.
They have attempted to overcome the collective action problems of the
Prisoner's Dilemma and move candidates, and thus society, to the
most beneficial outcome for campaign finance restrictions. These
entrepreneurs signaled to their challengers and the electorate that
they perceived some sort of reputational benefit from agreeing to
additional campaign finance restrictions. In those instances where the
opponent perceived a similar level of reputational benefit, some form
of voluntary agreement was more likely than not to develop. 337 In
those situations where the opponent did not observe a similar benefit,
or perceived additional restrictions would pose a significant cost, the
development of a voluntary agreement was more likely than not to
fail. 338 Therefore, the success or failure of entering voluntary
agreements was primarily driven by perceived reputational gains or
losses. 339
334. See supra Part IV.B.
335. See Hetcher, supra note 97, at 35-38.
336. See id. at 10-32 (documenting the methods by which privacy norm proselytizers created
a demand for online privacy norms).
337. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B (discussing the voluntary campaign finance agreements).
338. See, e.g., text accompanying note 312 (discussing the failed attempt by Senator Lugar's
challenger to entice the Senator to enter a voluntary campaign finance agreement); see alsd
James Gerstenzang & Michael Finnegan, Campaign 2000; Candidates Offer Likely Glimpse of
Debate Plans, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at 25A (describing Senator McCain's failed attempt to
convince the presidential nominees, Al Gore and George W. Bush, to enter a voluntary soft
money ban during the final weeks of the campaign).
339. This Note does not specifically address the issues surrounding the enforceability of
voluntary campaign finance agreements successfully entered into. However, in many ways, voter
preference would also provide for accountability because election results are a candidate's
ultimate payoff. In addition, the FEC could continue to serve a critical role in providing a
nonpartisan source of financial data to help inform voters.
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At the core of a candidate's perception of reputational gains or
losses is the electorate's preference for additional campaign finance
restrictions. These preferences are in turn driven by what the
electorate believes to be the latest corruptive influence in politics.
Therefore, society's current "taste" for corruption will most likely
dictate a candidate's decision to enter or not enter a voluntary
campaign finance agreement. In those regions of the country where
preferences are strong enough, candidates could be encouraged to
enter voluntary agreements through the concept of shaming. Shaming
has been defined as "the process by which citizens publicly and self-
consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an
offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or
engaging in those activities. ' 340 To the extent that candidates violate
voter preferences as to campaign finance tactics, shaming could help
encourage the development of social campaign finance norms.341 These
norms could be captured in voluntary campaign finance agreements,
and any deviation from the agreements would affect what candidates
care about most-poll results on election day.
2. Individual Resistance of Soft Money as a Social Norm?
While Senator McCain is generally viewed as the spokesman
for the campaign finance reform movement, Senator Feingold is more
accurately described as the true reformer.342 Both politicians are
ardent supporters of a soft money ban and have publicly supported the
340. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631-32
(1996). Professor Kahan cites several examples of shaming, including the City of Hoboken's
practice of advertising the identities of those convicted of public urination as well as requiring
that the individuals clean the city's streets. See id. at 633. Stanford Law School Professor
Deborah Rhode recently suggested that federal judges use the informal sanction of shaming to
regulate themselves in the judicial clerk selection process. Groner, supra note 84. Professor
Rhode stated that the "judges have to exercise some reputational sanctions on their colleagues. If
they made it professionally unacceptable to buck the system, you'd have only a few renegades,
and we could live with a few renegades." Id.
341. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meaning of Shame Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 650 (1997) (suggesting that shaming influences the creation and
enforcement of social norms). But see John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on
Shaming, "White Collar" Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
1047, 1051-53 (2000) (challenging Kahan's positions and presumptions about shaming "white
collar" criminals and arguing that "white collar" criminals do not fit into the "one size fits all"
model that Kahan uses to promote shaming).
342. This division of labor is found frequently among United States Senators. As many
commentators suggest, some Senators are "show horses," that is, they use their elected office to
gain publicity for themselves and their positions, while others are "work horses" who work
steadfastly behind the scenes to forge legislation and champion their rhetoric with action. See,
e.g., Marshall J. Breger, The Administrative Conference of the United States: A Quarter Century
Perspective, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 813, 825 (1992).
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prohibition for many years.3 43 However, Senator Feingold, in contrast
to Senator McCain, actually practices what he preaches. As already
noted, Senator Feingold demonstrated his commitment to campaign
finance reform by entering into a voluntary campaign finance
agreement with Representative Mark Neumann in his 1998 Senate
campaign. 344 In addition to the restrictions outlined in the agreement,
Senator Feingold went a step further and refused to allow the
Democratic Party to spend soft money on his behalf.345 Senator
McCain, on the other hand, has benefited in the past from substantial
soft money donations.346
These actions suggest that Senator Feingold is a norm
entrepreneur in the campaign finance reform context.347 Not only has
he demonstrated the viability of voluntary campaign finance
agreements, but he has also taken unilateral action in his attempt to
convince the electorate and fellow politicians that soft money should
not be tolerated in the campaign finance system.348 Senator Feingold's
refusal to accept soft money contributions during his 1998 campaign
was a signal to voters, as well as to present and future challengers,
that he believes that there is a significant reputational benefit to
prohibiting soft money contributions. The 2000 presidential primaries
suggest that his behavior did take on some of the symbolic value
necessary to develop a social norm. For instance, Senator McCain and
former Senator Bill Bradley voluntarily agreed to ban their parties
from accepting soft money if they became the presidential nominees,
and Senator McCain went on to vow to refuse soft money regardless of
whom was the Democratic nominee. 349 Nevertheless, individual
resistance to soft money as a social norm appears more difficult to
develop than acceptance of voluntary campaign finance agreements
because of the mixed success of unilateral disarmament and the
343. See, e.g., Feingold, supra note 137, at 59-60 (explaining history of McCain-Feingold bill
and the impetus for its introduction).
344. See supra Part IV.B.4.
345. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1832 (reporting that both candidates agreed not to raise soft
money but that Representative Neumann allowed the Republican Party to spend money on his
campaign).
346. Editorial, 'Tag Team'Right to Battle Soft Money, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 18, 1999, at 16A.
347. As discussed supra Part II.C, norm entrepreneurs are actors who promote the change of
social norms.
348. In this respect, Senator Feingold represents a norm proselytizer, someone who promotes
social norms for moral reasons which they themselves accept. See Hetcher, supra note 97, at 2
n.4.
349. Ken Foskett, Campaign 2000: McCain, Bradley Take the Pledge on Soft Money; Gore
Takes Out an Ad Saying He'l Go Along if the GOP Nominee Agrees; Bush Calls the Idea Unfair,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 17, 1999, at 1E. Evidently these pledges were not as successful as the
candidates had hoped, as neither received their party's presidential nomination.
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numerous incentives affecting a candidate's personal decision to
accept or reject soft money contributions.
V. CONCLUSION
Not all legislation is bad, but Congress should avoid the
regulation of campaign finance. As the last three decades have
revealed, legislative attempts to correct campaign finance abuses
inevitably yield unintended consequences that "keep reformers a step
behind in their battle against monetary influence and other campaign
tactics."350 In addition, interest group theory demonstrates that self-
regulatory legislation is inherently flawed and will not effectuate the
public interest.351 Alternatively, Congress should take advantage of
the benefits of private ordering and encourage candidates to
experiment with voluntary campaign finance agreements, rather than
imposing additional restrictions.
As this Note suggests, not all soft money is inherently evil, and
voters should be allowed to demand the type of campaign finance
restrictions they deem necessary. Voluntary campaign finance
agreements are attractive because they are more flexible than legal
regulations and can adapt to a specific perceived corruptive
influence. 352 Similar to many cooperative interactions, voluntary
campaign finance agreements are subject to the collective action
problems of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Norm entrepreneurs, such as
Senator Feingold, have stimulated the creation of social campaign
finance norms to overcome these collective action failures. If voluntary
campaign finance agreements or individual resistance to soft money
could be accepted as a social norm, then perhaps shaming and fear of
electoral rebuke could encourage their development as national
alternatives to additional campaign finance legislation.
Todd R. Overman*
350. Nagle, supra note 242, at 1839.
351. See supra Part III.C.2.
352. See supra Part III.C.2.
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